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Genocide and the International Court
of Justice: Finally, a Duty
to Prevent the Crime of Crimes
William A Schabas
Professor of Human Rights Law, National University of Ireland,
Galway; Director, Irish Centre for Human Rights
The International Court of Justice has issued its long-awaited decision in the suit
filed by Bosnia and Herzegovina against Serbia and Montenegro with respect to the
1992–1995 war. The decision confirms the factual and legal determinations of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, ruling that genocide
was committed during the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995 but that the conflict
as a whole was not genocidal in nature. The Court held that Serbia had failed in its
duty to prevent genocide in Srebrenica, although—because, the Court said, there
was no certainty that it could have succeeded in preventing the genocide—no
damages were awarded. The judgment provides a strong and authoritative
statement of the general duty upon states to prevent genocide that dovetails
well with the doctrine of the responsibility to protect.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations.1 It hears disputes between states and issues advisory opinions about
legal issues at the request of other bodies within the UN system. All UN member states
are parties to the Statute of the Court, which is integrated within the Charter of the
United Nations, and are eligible to nominate judges. But the ICJ does not have
automatic jurisdiction to hear cases involving those states. A state can only be sued by
another state before the ICJ if it has formally accepted ICJ jurisdiction. States may do
this by making a general declaration, pursuant to article 36(2) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, but only about one-third of the members of the UN have
done this. Some 300 specific treaties also provide that the ICJ is the venue for
settlement of disputes concerning those treaties. Of these, perhaps the best known is
the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG),
art. 9 of which states,
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or
fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a
State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article 3, shall be
submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to
the dispute.2

Invoking art. 9 of the UNCG, on 20 March 1993, as war raged on the territory of
the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina filed an application before the ICJ
against what was then known as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Bosnia and
Herzegovina charged that Yugoslavia ‘‘had breached, and is continuing to breach, its
legal obligations toward the People and State of Bosnia and Herzegovina under
Articles I, II (a), II (b), II (c), II (d), III (a), III (b), III (c), III (d), III (e), IV and V of the
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Genocide Convention.’’ Article 9 had been invoked only once before, by Pakistan
against India following the secession of Bangladesh, but the suit was dropped following
negotiations between the parties.3 Since the Bosnian application of 1993, there have
been several attempts to apply art. 9, but none has led to a final judgment involving
interpretation of the substantive provisions of the UNCG. Consequently, the ICJ’s
judgment of 26 February 2007 in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and
Montenegro constitutes a seminal event in the evolving law of genocide.
In its February 2007 ruling,4 the ICJ adopts a relatively narrow and conservative
approach to the scope of the crime of genocide. It clearly distinguishes genocide from
the cognate concept of ‘‘ethnic cleansing,’’ following the general approach taken by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in its practice and
judicial determinations. The ICTY, another UN judicial institution, was established by
the Security Council in 1993 to deal with war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.5 Although
rejecting the charge that there was a general genocidal pattern during the conflict, for
which Belgrade bore responsibility, the court acknowledges, in accordance with the
findings of the ICTY, that the July 1995 Srebrenica massacre deserves the label
‘‘genocide.’’ Many observers were dismayed by the court’s relatively restrictive
approach, which resulted in the dismissal of most of the allegations made by Bosnia
and Herzegovina, a painful setback for the Bosnian Muslims, who suffered so terribly
during the conflict. Some have tried to put a brave face on things, but for the Bosnians,
if there was any victory here it was Pyrrhic in nature. Because the ICJ’s jurisdiction is
based solely on the UNCG, it has no residual authority to make determinations that
other violations of international law, such as crimes against humanity (within which
‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ is easily subsumed), have been committed.
But this cloud has a silver lining. The court has made a major pronouncement on
the duty to prevent genocide, declaring that this obligation, set out in exceedingly
laconic terms both in the title and in art. 1 of the 1948 UNCG, requires states to take
action when genocide is threatened outside their own territory, to the extent that they
may be able to exercise some influence. It is a powerful message, with tremendous
implications going well beyond the narrow finding that Serbia might have done more
to avert the 1995 Srebrenica massacre. The court’s approach to the duty to prevent
genocide dovetails neatly with recent developments in the political bodies of the
United Nations recognizing a ‘‘responsibility to protect,’’ and it provides further
support for the entrenchment of this doctrine within customary international law.

Procedural Background to the Judgment
Bosnia and Herzegovina had been a component republic of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia since the latter’s creation, in 1945, following World War II.
The other republics were relatively homogenous in terms of ethnic composition,
although they all had significant minority populations. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, on
the other hand, there was no dominant ethnic group. Its multiethnic population
consisted of large numbers of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, although the Muslims were
the largest group. As Yugoslavia was disintegrating, in the early 1990s, its large Serb
minority favored amalgamating the Serb-dominated parts of Bosnia’s territory with
Serbia itself to create a ‘‘Greater Serbia.’’ This idea was opposed by the other two
ethnic groups, as well as by the European Union and other elements in the
international community. Bosnia and Herzegovina seceded from Yugoslavia in
April 1992, and armed conflict between the ethnic groups began almost immediately.
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The war was characterized by campaigns of what was soon labeled ‘‘ethnic cleansing,’’
aimed at driving the various ethnic groups from their ancestral homes.
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application to the ICJ was filed on 20 March 1993.6
When the application to the ICJ was initiated, Bosnia also sought provisional
measures, pursuant to art. 41 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
asking ‘‘[t]hat Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), together with its agents and
surrogates in Bosnia and elsewhere, must immediately cease and desist from all acts of
genocide and genocidal acts against the People and State of Bosnia and Herzegovina.’’7
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) replied with a request that the court order
provisional measures against Bosnia and Herzegovina, including directions to leave
Serb towns alone and to cease destruction of Orthodox churches and places of worship
and of other Serb cultural heritage, and that the government of Bosnia ‘‘put an end to
all acts of discrimination based on nationality or religion and the practice of ‘ethnic
cleansing,’ including the discrimination related to the delivery of humanitarian aid,
against the Serb population in the ‘Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.’ ’’8
On 8 April 1993, the court ordered provisional measures against Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) and indicated that neither party should take action
that might aggravate or extend the dispute. The Court held that art. 9 of the UNCG
appears
to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded to the extent
that the subject-matter of the dispute relates to ‘‘the interpretation, application or
fulfilment’’ of the Convention, including disputes ‘‘relating to the responsibility of a
State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III of the
Convention.’’9

The court’s order stated that ‘‘there is a grave risk of acts of genocide being
committed.’’10
On 27 July 1993, Bosnia and Herzegovina applied once again to the ICJ for
additional provisional measures. The application focused on issues arising from the
arms embargo placed upon the entire region by the UN Security Council. Bosnia and
Herzegovina asked the court to declare
[t]hat in order to fulfil their obligations under the Genocide Convention under the
current circumstances, all Contracting Parties thereto must have the ability to provide
military weapons, equipment, supplies and armed forces (soldiers, sailors, airpeople)
to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina at its request.11

Yugoslavia again answered with its own request for provisional measures, seeking an
order against the ‘‘so-called Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’’ that it ‘‘take all
measures within its power to prevent commission of the crime of genocide against the
Serb ethnic group.’’12 The court concluded, unanimously, that Yugoslavia (Bosnia and
Herzegovina) ‘‘should immediately, in pursuance of its undertaking in the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948,
take all measures within its power to prevent commission of the crime of genocide’’
and more specifically that it should
ensure that any military, paramilitary or irregular armed units which may be
directed or supported by it, as well as any organizations and persons which may
be subject to its control, direction or influence, do not commit any acts of genocide,
of conspiracy to commit genocide, of direct and public incitement to commit genocide,
or of complicity in genocide, whether directed against the Muslim population of
Bosnia and Herzegovina or against any other national, ethnical, racial or religious
group.13
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The court refused the applicant’s request that it also consider the Treaty between
the Allied and Associated Powers and the Kingdom of Saint-Germain-en-Laye of
10 September 1919, as well as the customary and conventional international laws
of war and international humanitarian law, as a basis for the litigation.14
Shortly after the issuance of the second provisional measures order, Bosnia
declared its intention to institute proceedings against the United Kingdom, based on
the latter’s obligation to prevent genocide. Its statement charged the United Kingdom
was ‘‘jointly and severally liable for all of the harm that has been inflicted upon the
People and State of Bosnia and Herzegovina because the United Kingdom is an aider
and abettor to genocide under the Genocide Convention and international criminal
law.’’15 The United Kingdom replied, on 6 December, that the application was without
foundation, and on 17 December 1993 Bosnia and Herzegovina informed the Security
Council of its decision not to proceed against the United Kingdom.
Litigation before the ICJ typically has two phases. The first addresses preliminary
objections from the defendant or respondent state. Serbia and Montenegro contested
the court’s authority to rule on the Bosnian application; its preliminary objections were
dismissed by the court on 11 July 1996.16 Once the preliminary issues had been
resolved, the case should then have proceeded to a ruling on the merits of the
application within a reasonable time. In fact, however, it would take more than a
decade for the court to issue its final judgment, an extraordinary delay even for an
institution accustomed to working at a leisurely pace. The primary reason for this
delay was division within the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina about whether to
proceed with the case. Since the December 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement,
representatives of the Serb entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina have participated
in the national government. When they were in positions of responsibility within the
foreign ministry, there were attempts to withdraw the case. Although ultimately
unsuccessful, these initiatives did delay the progress of the case toward hearing
and judgment.
Other issues also helped to delay the case. After the 1996 admissibility ruling,
Serbia and Montenegro filed what is known as a counter-claim, in effect arguing that
Bosnia, too, had committed genocide against Serb populations. Although the counterclaim was eventually withdrawn, valuable time was devoted to addressing the issues it
raised.17 More important was a dispute about whether or not Serbia and Montenegro
was actually a member of the United Nations during the relevant period. This had not
been properly addressed in the early stages of the case, and the dispute came to a head
only after 2000, when Serbia and Montenegro was admitted to the United Nations as
a new member state.
When states break up, normally one of the component parts is recognized as
the ‘‘continuator’’ of the legal personality of its predecessor. Thus, when the
Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, Russia—rather than, say, Kazakhstan or
Latvia—retained the legal rights and obligations of the Soviet Union. Russia, and not
Kazakhstan or Latvia, took on the USSR’s permanent seat in the UN Security Council,
for example. When Yugoslavia collapsed, many assumed that Serbia and Montenegro
would continue the legal personality of the previous state. But, unlike the case of
the Soviet Union, the situation was muddied by the suspension of Yugoslavia from the
United Nations as a sanction for its belligerent conduct. If the Belgrade regime was not
a member of the United Nations, then it was also excluded from the ICJ and was not a
party to the UNCG. And this meant that the court could not validly exercise
its jurisdiction.
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In 2001, following its admission to the United Nations, Serbia and Montenegro
asked the ICJ to revise its 1996 judgment on admissibility, on the grounds that at the
time it had not been a member of the United Nations and therefore could not have been
a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Moreover, Serbia and
Montenegro argued that it became a party to the UNCG only on 8 March 2001 and,
moreover, that its accession to the convention included a reservation to art. 9. In its
judgment of 3 February 2003, the Court ruled the application for revision inadmissible,
stating that, in accordance with art. 61(1) of its statute, it could revise an earlier
judgment only ‘‘based upon the discovery’’ of some fact which, ‘‘when the judgment was
given,’’ was unknown. Serbia had argued that its admission to the United Nations in
2000 was such a ‘‘new fact.’’ The court, however, said that
[a] fact which occurs several years after a judgment has been given is not a ‘‘new’’
fact within the meaning of Article 61; this remains the case irrespective of the
legal consequences that such a fact may have.18

Nevertheless, the court returned to this question in its February 2007 judgment on
the merits of the case.
By then, the matter had been further complicated as a result of a ruling by the ICJ
in a totally separate case. In 1999, as bombs fell on Belgrade, Serbia and Montenegro
invoked art. 9 of the UNCG and sued several NATO states before the ICJ. Belgrade’s
argument on the substance of the claim bordered on the frivolous, but it had a good
case with respect to another aspect of the application, namely that the NATO states
had breached the UN Charter by using force in the absence of any Security Council
authorization. The court never ruled on the merits, dismissing the entire claim
because, it said, Serbia and Montenegro had not been a member of the United Nations
in 1999:
at the time of filing of its Application to institute the present proceedings before the
Court on 29 April 1999, the Applicant in the present case, Serbia and Montenegro, was
not a Member of the United Nations, and consequently, was not, on that basis, a State
party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice. It follows that the Court was
not open to Serbia and Montenegro.19

In its February 2007 judgment, however, the court rejected Serbia’s argument on this
point. On the surface, at least, this looks like a blatant example of double standards:
when Serbia sues, it doesn’t exist, but when it is sued, it exists. The court said that it
could not dismiss the Bosnian application on the grounds that Serbia and Montenegro
had not been a member of the United Nations during the 1990s because it had already
decided the contrary in its 1996 decision on preliminary objections in the case. The
court invoked a Latin maxim, res judicata, which means that once a matter has been
litigated and resolved between two parties, it cannot be reopened.20 A corollary of the
concept, known by the name ‘‘double jeopardy,’’ is well known to non-specialists.
The res judicata determination is one of the profoundly unsatisfactory elements of
the judgment, and it will hardly enhance the credibility of the court’s ruling among the
Serbs, for whom it can only bolster the sense of victimization by hypocritical
international institutions. The blow is softened by the fact that Serbia fared
rather well on the merits of the case. Several judges on the court were plainly
embarrassed by the res judicata argument and appended individual opinions
indicating that it would have been preferable to dismiss the Bosnian application
outright and for the same reasons that the court had earlier rejected Serbia’s claim
against the NATO states.21
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The Scope of Article 9 of the UNCG
Article 9 of the UNCG gives the ICJ jurisdiction over disputes between states about
‘‘the interpretation, application or fulfilment’’ of the convention. Whether this
provision encompasses charges that a state has actually committed genocide has
been a matter of some dispute over the years. It is part of an even larger debate about
whether states actually can commit crimes, including genocide. At Nuremberg, the
judges of the International Military Tribunal famously said, ‘‘Crimes against
international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international
law be enforced.’’22 The International Law Commission, a subsidiary organ of the
UN General Assembly with responsibility for the codification and progressive
development of international law, has declined to resolve the issue of whether socalled state crimes fall within the broader rubric of ‘‘state responsibility.’’23
The court settled this dispute by concluding that states can indeed commit the
crime of genocide and that charges on this basis fall within the scope of art. 9 of the
UNCG. Here it distinguishes between the general proposition, in art. 1, to ‘‘undertake
to prevent and to punish’’ the crime of genocide and the obligations set out in arts. 5–7
concerning the prosecution of genocide, the adoption of effective legislation, and
cooperation in extradition. The court states that art. 1 is ‘‘not merely hortatory or
purposive.’’24 Thus, in addition to the obligation to punish, to which several more
specific provisions of the UNCG are addressed, there is also an obligation to prevent.
Nevertheless, the court concedes that the convention does not expressly impose an
obligation upon states not to commit genocide.25 It concludes that such an obligation
exists as a necessary corollary of the obligation to prevent:
Under Article I the States parties are bound to prevent such an act, which it describes
as ‘‘a crime under international law,’’ being committed. The Article does not expressis
verbis require States to refrain from themselves committing genocide. However, in the
view of the Court, taking into account the established purpose of the Convention, the
effect of Article I is to prohibit States from themselves committing genocide. Such a
prohibition follows, first, from the fact that the Article categorizes genocide as ‘‘a crime
under international law’’: by agreeing to such a categorization, the States parties must
logically be undertaking not to commit the act so described. Secondly, it follows from the
expressly stated obligation to prevent the commission of acts of genocide. That
obligation requires the States parties, inter alia, to employ the means at their disposal,
in circumstances to be described more specifically later in this Judgment, to prevent
persons or groups not directly under their authority from committing an act of genocide
or any of the other acts mentioned in Article III. It would be paradoxical if States were
thus under an obligation to prevent, so far as within their power, commission of
genocide by persons over whom they have a certain influence, but were not forbidden to
commit such acts through their own organs, or persons over whom they have such firm
control that their conduct is attributable to the State concerned under international
law. In short, the obligation to prevent genocide necessarily implies the prohibition of
the commission of genocide.26

The court next examined whether the parties to the convention are also under an
obligation, by virtue of the convention, not to commit genocide themselves. It must be
observed at the outset that such an obligation is not expressly imposed by the actual
terms of the convention. The court reviewed the drafting history and other materials to
support its conclusion that states are under an obligation not to commit the crime of
genocide and that they incur their state responsibility should they violate this duty.
‘‘[I]f an organ of the State, or a person or group whose acts are legally attributable to
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the State, commits any of the acts proscribed by Article III of the Convention, the
international responsibility of that State is incurred,’’ the judgment concludes.27
The Court itself seemed to acknowledge that the answer is not obvious. Some judges
also dissented on this issue, further evidence of the difficulty the question raises.28
Thus, the court concluded that parties to the UNCG ‘‘are bound not to commit
genocide, through the actions of their organs or persons or groups whose acts are
attributable to them.’’29 This conclusion applies both to the crime of genocide itself,
which is defined in art. 2 of the UNCG, and to the four other punishable acts listed in
art. 3, namely conspiracy, attempt, direct and public incitement, and complicity.
Replying to the argument that international law does not recognize the concept of state
crimes, the court said that it was ruling on issues of state responsibility, not state
criminality, referring to what it calls ‘‘duality of responsibility’’30 and noting art. 25(4)
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which declares that
‘‘No provision in this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility shall affect
the responsibility of States under law.’’31 The court also found support for its position
in the drafting history of the UNCG. The arguments submitted by Serbia were not
devoid of any merit, and they spoke to a legitimate controversy in the interpretation of
the convention. The court’s analysis helpfully clarifies the matter and should largely
resolve any disputes on this point in the future.

The Burden of Proof
Cases before the ICJ usually involve facts that are largely uncontested. The hearings
are generally not trials, at which evidence is produced and disputed. Bosnia v. Serbia
was an exception. As a preliminary matter, the court made some important and
controversial determinations about principles and rules of evidence.
There was particular debate about Serbia’s production of documents emanating
from its Supreme Defense Council. These materials had been ‘‘redacted’’; that is,
portions of them had been blacked out. Serbia’s justification for failing to provide the
court with the entire documents was the protection of its national security interests.
Theoretically, the court was empowered to order the production of these materials,
in accordance with art. 49 of its statute.32 But it did not exercise these powers against
Serbia. Furthermore, Bosnia invited the court to draw negative inferences from
Serbia’s refusal, and one of the judges, in a dissenting opinion, agreed with this
proposal.33 To the dismay of the applicants, however, the court did not attach any
special and pejorative significance to the Serbian position. The court’s reticence may
have been driven by concern about the long-term policy implications of demanding that
states produce evidence over and above their national security concerns, a matter of
great sensitivity. In an early ruling, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY insisted that
international judges, not governments, would be the arbiters of national security
concerns.34 The ruling terrified many states, and several months later, when they were
drafting the Rome Statute, they made sure that no such power of judges was
recognized.35 Were the court to set a precedent in a case involving confidential
documents in the archives in Belgrade, the same approach would have to apply to the
CIA, MI6, and the Sûreté, at least theoretically. Wise judges often rule not so much on
the basis of the situation immediately before them as in contemplation of the eventual
consequences rulings may have on imagined future disputes.
The ICJ’s discussion of the standard or burden of proof reveals the complexity of
the issues, which seem to straddle an unclear distinction between state responsibility
for international crimes and individual criminal responsibility. One aspect of this
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difficulty has already been discussed, namely, whether or not a state can commit
genocide. In a compromise formulation, the court declares that a state can violate the
UNCG by perpetrating genocide, although it states that by so doing the state engages
its responsibility in a classic international law sense, rather than saying that it
commits a ‘‘state crime.’’ With respect to evidence, Bosnia and Herzegovina argued
that because the matter was one of state responsibility and not criminal liability, the
court should apply the ordinary standard of proof, usually described as the ‘‘balance of
probabilities’’ or the ‘‘preponderance of evidence’’; this means that the court must
accept the applicant’s version of the facts to the extent that it is more likely than the
respondent’s to be true. Serbia and Montenegro argued, on the contrary, that because
of the nature of the litigation, involving charges of state responsibility for what is
arguably the crime of crimes, the applicant should be required to prove its case beyond
a reasonable doubt, which is the standard of proof normally used in criminal
proceedings.36 For example, art. 66(3) of the Rome Statute says that ‘‘[i]n order to
convict the accused, the Court must be convinced of the guilt of the accused beyond
a reasonable doubt.’’37
Without expressly adopting either formulation, the court’s judgment definitely
favors the approach proposed by Serbia: ‘‘In respect of the Applicant’s claim that the
Respondent has breached its undertakings to prevent genocide and to punish and
extradite persons charged with genocide, the Court requires proof at a high level of
certainty appropriate to the seriousness of the allegation.’’38 This conclusion is of
crucial importance, to the extent that the Bosnians were relying upon evidence
presented to the ICTY, where the ‘‘beyond reasonable doubt’’ norm applies,39 but
asking the ICJ to draw different conclusions pursuant to a lower standard of proof.
To the extent that the court adopted a standard of proof analogous to the ‘‘reasonable
doubt’’ requirement of criminal tribunals, this would enhance the likelihood that it
would also reach the same conclusions on issues of fact—and this is indeed what
happened.
The ‘‘high level of certainty appropriate to the seriousness of the allegation’’
standard of proof is an innovation in the jurisprudence of the ICJ. In December 2005,
the ICJ ruled on charges by the Democratic Republic of Congo against Uganda that
were framed in the language of human-rights law rather than that of international
criminal law. The court then said it had ‘‘credible evidence sufficient to conclude’’ that
Ugandan forces had committed various violations of human rights, although these
might well also have been described as international crimes: acts of killing, torture,
and other forms of inhumane treatment of the civilian population; destruction of
villages and civilian buildings; failure to distinguish between civilian and military
targets and to protect the civilian population in fighting with other combatants;
incitement of ethnic conflict; and training of child soldiers.40 In fact, the terminology in
both cases is novel; arguably, the court raised the burden of proof when it moved from
‘‘credible evidence sufficient to conclude’’ in Congo v. Uganda to a ‘‘high level of
certainty’’ in Bosnia v. Serbia. The distinction is unfamiliar to lawyers and probably
mystifyingly semantic to others.
There is some merit on both sides of this debate, but ultimately the court’s
approach seems wise, albeit frustrating for those who seek to invoke the UNCG in noncriminal proceedings. The rationale for such a high burden of proof in criminal justice
is the gravity of the consequences. A finding of genocide against a state, although it
cannot result in a loss of liberty, as is the case with an individual defendant, brings
with it a terrible stigma, not to mention potentially enormous financial liabilities.
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It makes sense, then, that a comparably high standard of proof be imposed when a
finding of genocide is sought against a state. The other benefit of this approach is that
it brings a degree of coherence to litigation concerning genocide. It hardly seems
desirable for criminal courts to acquit upon charges of genocide while tribunals
addressing state responsibility for genocide reach the opposite result, essentially on
the basis of technical legal distinctions that would be poorly understood by nonspecialists. The dichotomy between levels of proof is familiar to lawyers trained in the
common law, where apparently contradictory rulings based on different standards of
proof are well known (recall O.J. Simpson’s acquittal for murder and his subsequent
condemnation, before a civil court, for ‘‘wrongful death’’). In legal systems based on
continental models, civil and criminal justice are often joined in one proceeding,
precisely to ensure a single ruling on the core issue. Although indirectly, this seems
to be what the ICJ has done, too.

Distinguishing Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide
So-called ethnic cleansing and genocide should not be confounded, says the ICJ.
It observes that ‘‘ethnic cleaning’’ has often been used to describe the events in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, referring, for example, to the final report of the UN Commission of
Experts41 and to a General Assembly resolution.42 The court might have added a
reference to one of the individual opinions accompanying its provisional measures
ruling issued in 1993, when the application was first filed.43 According to the court, the
expression ‘‘is in practice used, by reference to a specific region or area, to mean
‘rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove
persons of given groups from the area.’ ’’44 The court notes that not only is the term not
used in the UNCG but a proposal during the drafting aimed at including ‘‘measures to
oblige members of a group to abandon their homes in order to escape the threat
of subsequent ill-treatment’’45 was not accepted. Accordingly, said the court,
[n]either the intent, as a matter of policy, to render an area ‘‘ethnically homogeneous,’’
nor the operations that may be carried out to implement such policy, can as
such be designated as genocide: the intent that characterizes genocide is ‘‘to destroy,
in whole or in part’’ a particular group, and deportation or displacement of the
members of a group, even if effected by force, is not necessarily equivalent to
destruction of that group, nor is such destruction an automatic consequence of
the displacement.46

Once again, the court’s position is consistent with pronouncements of the ICTY, which
are referred to in the judgment. For example, in Krstic´, the Trial Chamber said that
although ‘‘there are obvious similarities between a genocidal policy and the policy
commonly known as ‘ethnic cleansing,’ ’’47 ‘‘[a] clear distinction must be drawn between
physical destruction and mere dissolution of a group. The expulsion of a group or part
of a group does not in itself suffice for genocide.’’48 It cannot be gainsaid, however, that
views have been expressed, both within case law and in academic writing,49 supporting
a more liberal interpretation by which genocide and ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ are merged.
In Krstic´, Judge Shahabuddeen of the Appeals Chamber leaned in this direction.50
His views were subsequently echoed—and, moreover, amplified—in a ruling by one of
the ICTY Trial Chambers, in which the judges argued that ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ should
be subsumed within the crime of genocide.51 Indeed, it is precisely because this debate
persists that the ICJ’s February 2007 ruling is so helpful. It should largely resolve the
controversy.
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Establishing the Intent to Commit Genocide
Much of the ICJ’s attention was taken up with establishing the mental element of the
crime of genocide. The court explains that the crime of genocide involves not only the
intent to commit the underlying act, such as killing, but also that the act be done with
the intent to destroy the group. It is not enough, says the court, that the perpetrator
possess a discriminatory intent. The court compares genocidal intent with that of the
related crime against humanity of persecution.52 These statements are not
particularly controversial, to the extent that they are largely based on familiar
pronouncements in the case law of the ICTY.
The literature on this subject is enormous, as are the statements of the ad hoc
tribunals. The difference, though, is that the court was looking for the mental element
through the lens of state responsibility. It was asking whether Serbia (or the
Republika Srpska) possessed the ‘‘mental element’’ for the commission of genocide,
rather than whether this was the case for any particular individual. The closest we
have come in the past to such analysis is the report of the Darfur Commission,
mandated by the UN Security Council to consider whether genocide was being
committed in Sudan.53
But can a state have a ‘‘mental element’’? Certainly, the analogy with individuals,
in whose case concepts of knowledge and intent are relatively well understood in
national criminal law and easily transposable to an international context, is only very
approximate. In practice, what we look for is not a ‘‘mental element’’ but, rather, a
‘‘plan or policy.’’ In its February 2007 judgment, the ICJ observes that the material
element of the crime of genocide may have been present but that it had not been
‘‘conclusively established that the massive killings of members of the protected group
were committed with the specific intent (dolus specialis) on the part of the perpetrators
to destroy, in whole or in part, the group as such.’’54 But in reality, the court was
looking for evidence of a plan or policy. Otherwise, it would be required to consider the
hypothesis that a single individual, acting alone, might have committed one of the acts
with a genocidal specific intent. The ICJ does not indulge in such inquiry, but the
question has engaged others who have asked whether genocide was committed,
including the ICTY.55 Similarly, the Darfur Commission does not exclude the
possibility of lone perpetrators.56
But both the Darfur Commission and the ICJ have looked, in practice, to state
policy. Absent evidence of such a policy, they conclude that genocide was not
committed. A similar discussion has taken place with respect to crimes against
humanity. After noting that ‘‘[t]here has been some debate in the jurisprudence of this
Tribunal as to whether a policy or plan constitutes an element of the definition of
crimes against humanity,’’ the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has said that practice
‘‘overwhelmingly supports the contention that no such requirement exists under
customary international law.’’57 One justification for its position is the earlier
conclusion that a plan or policy is not required to establish the crime of genocide.
Article 2 of the UNCG does not say anything about a policy element, and this has
led many commentators and judges to the conclusion that it is not an element of the
crime. With respect to crimes against humanity, the question is a bit more
complicated: although the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY ruled, in Kunarac, that
this was not part of customary law, it did not mention art. 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute,
which suggests the opposite when it states that ‘‘‘attack directed against any civilian
population’ means a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts
referred to in para. 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a
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State or organizational policy to commit such attack.’’ Along somewhat the same lines,
the Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute require that genocidal acts ‘‘took place in
the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or was
conduct that could itself effect such destruction.’’58 This component was adopted in
reaction to a ruling from a Trial Chamber of the ICTY that an individual, acting alone,
could perpetrate genocide.
Cherif Bassiouni has argued, in my view quite persuasively, that we have got the
definition of crimes against humanity upside down. He says that the ‘‘widespread or
systematic’’ elements, set out in art. 7(1) of the Rome Statute and well established in
customary law, are better viewed as means of proving the state plan or policy. In other
words, the truly distinguishing element of crimes against humanity is the fact that
they are part of a state plan or policy rather than that they are widespread or
systematic.59 This makes perfect sense when one realizes that the designation ‘‘crimes
against humanity’’ was originally designed to capture crimes of state that went
unpunished precisely because the state was complicit in them: it was a way of
addressing state crimes, not perverse individuals, although it was premised on judging
and punishing the individuals responsible for such policies. The International Military
Tribunal never addressed the issue of plan or policy directly, and the reason is obvious:
the Nazi plan and policy to wage aggressive war and to exterminate the Jews of Europe
underpinned the entire case. Why would the tribunal ever have even spoken to the
issue, under the circumstances?
Why would the same reasoning not apply to genocide? Thus, the so-called mental
element, although worded in criminal law terminology, is actually an attempt to define
the content of the state plan or policy. By this logic, a state would be found to have
committed genocide if there were evidence of a plan or policy indicating an intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group as such.
In effect, this is what the ICJ and the Darfur Commission have done. They have
searched not for the mens rea of an individual but, rather, for the policy of a state.

Was Genocide Committed in Bosnia?
The judgment of the ICJ concludes that genocide was not committed during the conflict
in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995, with the exception of the
Srebrenica massacre in mid-July 1995. At Srebrenica, Bosnian Serb military units
directed by General Ratko Mladić were responsible for the summary execution of
approximately 7,000 Muslim men and boys over the course of several days. On the nonSrebrenica charges, the court states,
[I]t is established by overwhelming evidence that massive killings in specific areas and
detention camps throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina were perpetrated
during the conflict. Furthermore, the evidence presented shows that the victims were in
large majority members of the protected group, which suggests that they may have
been systematically targeted by the killings. The Court notes in fact that, while the
Respondent contested the veracity of certain allegations, and the number of victims, or
the motives of the perpetrators, as well as the circumstances of the killings and their
legal qualification, it never contested, as a matter of fact, that members of the protected
group were indeed killed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Court thus finds that it has
been established by conclusive evidence that massive killings of members of the
protected group occurred and that therefore the requirements of the material element,
as defined by Article II (a) of the Convention, are fulfilled . . .
The court is however not convinced, on the basis of the evidence before it, that it has
been conclusively established that the massive killings of members of the protected
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group were committed with the specific intent (dolus specialis) on the part of the
perpetrators to destroy, in whole or in part, the group as such. The court has carefully
examined the criminal proceedings of the ICTY and the findings of its chambers, cited
above, and observes that none of those convicted were found to have acted with specific
intent (dolus specialis). The killings outlined above may amount to war crimes and
crimes against humanity, but the court has no jurisdiction to determine whether this is
so. In the exercise of its jurisdiction under the Genocide Convention, the Court finds
that it has not been established by the Applicant that the killings amounted to acts of
genocide prohibited by the Convention.60

These findings should come as no surprise to anyone familiar with the case law and
the practice of the ICTY. In two cases concerning Srebrenica, the tribunal has
convicted defendants of aiding and abetting genocide. It has held that while the
accused, General Radislav Krstić and Colonel Vidoje Blagojević, did not themselves
intend to commit genocide, they assisted the units controlled by General Mladić,
knowing of his genocidal plans.61 Otherwise, the tribunal has consistently acquitted
persons charged with genocide with respect to ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ and the
atrocities perpetrated in concentration camps during the conflict. The accused were
invariably convicted of crimes against humanity instead.62 Moreover, the Office of the
Prosecutor had often indicated its ambivalence on the subject by declining to charge
genocide, in many cases, or by withdrawing genocide indictments in exchange
for a guilty plea.63
Bosnia and Herzegovina had presented indictments alleging genocide in support of
its claim, but the court quite correctly noted that the fact the prosecutor might charge
genocide was of little real weight. What mattered, said the court, was the prosecutor’s
decision not to include a genocide charge, or to remove it by amendment subsequently
if it had been included initially.64 The prosecutor declined charging Serbian President
Slobodan Milošević with genocide with respect to Kosovo.65 Even more striking was the
decision to withdraw genocide charges against Biljana Plavšić, one of the Bosnian Serb
leaders at the height of the conflict.66 If she was not responsible for genocide, then who
was? When all of this was added up, it should have been clear to the lawyers for Bosnia
that their case sat on a fragile footing. One detail of prosecutorial practice that escaped
the court’s attention, although it only confirmed its general vision, was the failure of
the prosecutor to appeal a genocide acquittal, evidence once again of the ambiguities of
the court’s approach.67 Perhaps there was a forlorn but ultimately misguided hope that
the ICJ would ‘‘correct’’ its neighbor, the ICTY. But it did nothing of the sort, instead
showing great respect for the expertise of that institution on issues of both fact and
law.
Certainly, the ICJ endorsed the conclusion that genocide had been perpetrated at
Srebrenica. Here too, though, it followed the analysis of the ICTY, treating the
massacre as an isolated and ultimately idiosyncratic event within a broader conflict
whose essence was not fundamentally genocidal, a devastating and destructive attack
on the Muslims of Srebrenica that was improvised at the last minute by General
Mladić. That made the link much harder to draw between the Bosnian Serb soldiers in
Srebrenica and President Milošević, far away in the Serb capital. Not only has nobody
found the smoking gun to link Belgrade with the crime, it seems unlikely and
implausible that one existed. The unfinished trial of Milošević never succeeded in
joining up the dots to link him to Srebrenica.68 In fact, much of the evidence in that
proceeding pointed to a rift between Belgrade and the Bosnian Serb leaders, rather
than to the fabled conspiracy.
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Counsel for the Bosnians relied heavily upon the findings of the ICTY, yet at the
same time asked the court to go beyond these. For example, whereas the tribunal had
convicted General Stanislav Galić for crimes against humanity and war crimes with
respect to the shelling and sniping of Sarajevo, Bosnia wanted the ICJ to go further
and characterize such acts as genocide. This the ICJ refused to do. On this point, the
court noted that Serbia had conceded that crimes were committed during the siege of
Sarajevo that ‘‘could certainly be characterized as war crimes and certain even
as crimes against humanity.’’69
The court took an exceedingly deferential approach to the findings of the ICTY, in
effect acknowledging the latter’s expertise on issues both of fact and of law. Only when
the tribunal ventured beyond the parameters of international criminal law and into
the realm of state responsibility did the ICJ graciously rebuke it.70 Counsel for Serbia
and Montenegro seemed to appreciate this, for they quietly changed their attitude
toward the findings of the ICTY as the litigation advanced. Initially the Serbs had been
dismissive of the ICTY, but they became more comfortable with the case law as they
realized that judges in The Hague were failing to convict for genocide. This evolution
in the position of Serbia and Montenegro did not escape the notice of the ICJ.71
The ICJ’s deferential approach to the ICTY is a welcome development in terms of
clarifying the relationship between the two bodies; it addresses recent concerns about
a ‘‘fragmentation’’ of international law resulting from a proliferation of courts,
tribunals, and similar institutions. Yet, by adopting virtually uncritically the findings
in fact and law of the tribunal, the ICJ also perpetuates contradictions within that very
jurisprudence. That the ICJ was not unaware of some of the difficulties with the ICTY
case law is perhaps revealed in its somewhat equivocal concluding remark on the
Srebrenica genocide issue: ‘‘The Court sees no reason to disagree with the concordant
findings of the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber.’’72 Perhaps a more
affirmative statement might have been expected, under the circumstances.
The inconsistencies in the case law of the ICTY are apparent from an examination
of the two important Trial Chamber judgments adopted in the wake of the Appeals
Chamber’s April 2004 ruling in Krstic´, which dealt with Srebrenica. One Trial
Chamber, in Blagojevic´, took an exceedingly large and liberal approach to the concept
of genocide, one capable of including a range of acts of ‘‘ethnic cleansing.’’73 The other,
in Brd̄anin, hewed to the more restrictive approach and dismissed a charge of
genocide.74 It may well be argued that Brd̄anin is consistent with the majority in
Krstic´, whereas Blagojevic follows the dissent of Judge Shahabuddeen in Krstic´.
But that this diversity in the case follows what should have been a definitive ruling of
the Appeals Chamber reveals uncertainty within the tribunal itself about what Krstic´
resolved. Of interest here are statements from the presiding judge in Popovic´ et al., a
multi-defendant trial concerning the Srebrenica massacre currently underway before
the ICTY. At the ICTR in Arusha, judges have taken ‘‘judicial notice’’ of the Rwandan
genocide, in effect making proof thereof unnecessary in future cases.75 But in Popovic´,
even after the ICJ ruling, the ICTY resisted the temptation to declare that there would
be no further debate as to whether genocide had been committed at Srebrenica in
July 1995.
The Appeals Chamber judgment in Krstic´ is indeed problematic, and its internal
contradictions reveal major differences among the judges themselves. It did not, after
all, convict General Krstić of genocide. It endorsed a vision of the Srebrenica
‘‘genocide’’ by which the killings were not planned and organized but, rather, were
improvised in the course of a few days by General Mladić. Even then, of course, the
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Srebrenica massacre was accompanied by the evacuation of women and children. This
was, in fact, the responsibility of General Krstić. At its best, the evacuation was a
humanitarian gesture; taken at its worst, it amounted to ethnic cleansing. But was it
genocide? Do those who seek to destroy an ethnic group not ensure that the women and
children, above all, do not survive? That, at least, is how génocidaires behaved in
Nazi Germany and in Rwanda. As for the massacre of the men of military age, the
so-called genocidal act at the heart of the Srebrenica atrocities, this too is an act
shrouded in ambiguity. Murdering prisoners of war is, of course, an atrocious and
unpardonable war crime. But it does not unequivocally reveal an intent to destroy
an ethnic group.
The Krstic´ Appeals Chamber seemed to reach an unsatisfactory compromise,
rejecting the idea that ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ could amount to genocide, but then
concluding that acts that might well be described as ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ should be
labeled genocide. The way to cut the Gordian knot was for the Appeals Chamber to
contend that the intent was to destroy Muslim life in Srebrenica. But surely the
evacuation of a population, that is, ethnic cleansing, does precisely this. There were
implausible suggestions that killing the men would prevent the community from
reproducing itself. But if this was really the Serbs’ intent, why did they spare the boys?
Certainly contemporary history has shown that if the Serbs believed they could
physically destroy the Muslims of Srebrenica in this manner, they were making a gross
miscalculation. According to recent reports, Muslim life in Srebrenica is now more
vital and dynamic than ever.
None of this should be taken as an attempt to diminish the horror of the Srebrenica
massacre. The summary execution of the men of a community, coupled with the
expulsion of the women and children, is a horrific crime against humanity.
Nevertheless, if the theoretical construct of the crime of genocide proposed by the
ICTY and endorsed by the ICJ is to be sustained, it would have been more consistent
and coherent to conclude that Srebrenica, too, was not an act of genocide. Both the
ICTY and the ICJ seem to want to have their cake and to eat it too, espousing a
rigorous legal analysis of the elements of the crime but nevertheless bowing to the
crowd by acknowledging the most outrageous act in the entire war as rising to the
level of genocide.

Failure to Prevent Genocide
Still—and this is the most important and positive contribution of the ICJ’s
judgment—Belgrade should have seen the massacre coming, yet did nothing
to prevent it. As the court recalls, the 1948 UNCG calls upon states to prevent
genocide:
In view of their undeniable influence and of the information, voicing serious concern, in
their possession, the Yugoslav federal authorities should, in the view of the Court, have
made the best efforts within their power to try and prevent the tragic events then
taking shape, whose scale, though it could not have been foreseen with certainty, might
at least have been surmised. The FRY leadership, and President Milošević above all,
were fully aware of the climate of deep-seated hatred which reigned between the
Bosnian Serbs and the Muslims in the Srebrenica region. As the Court has noted in
paragraph 423 above, it has not been shown that the decision to eliminate physically
the whole of the adult male population of the Muslim community of Srebrenica was
brought to the attention of the Belgrade authorities. Nevertheless, given all the
international concern about what looked likely to happen at Srebrenica, given
Milošević’s own observations to Mladić, which made it clear that the dangers were
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known and that these dangers seemed to be of an order that could suggest intent to
commit genocide, unless brought under control, it must have been clear that there was
a serious risk of genocide in Srebrenica. Yet the Respondent has not shown that it took
any initiative to prevent what happened, or any action on its part to avert the atrocities
which were committed. It must therefore be concluded that the organs of the
Respondent did nothing to prevent the Srebrenica massacres, claiming that they
were powerless to do so, which hardly tallies with their known influence over the VRS.
As indicated above, for a State to be held responsible for breaching its obligation of
prevention, it does not need to be proven that the State concerned definitely had the
power to prevent the genocide; it is sufficient that it had the means to do so and that it
manifestly refrained from using them.76

And so Serbia failed to honor this obligation. But because Serbia could not necessarily
have prevented the crimes, no reparations or damages were assessed. According to the
ICJ, the required nexus for an award of compensation could only be considered ‘‘if the
Court were able to conclude from the case as a whole and with a sufficient degree of
certainty that the genocide at Srebrenica would in fact have been averted if the
Respondent had acted in compliance with its legal obligations. However, the court
clearly cannot do so.’’77
This fascinating conclusion seems pregnant with potential for the promotion of
human rights and the prevention of atrocities. As the court explains,
[t]he obligation to prevent the commission of the crime of genocide is imposed by the
Genocide Convention on any State party which, in a given situation, has it in its power
to contribute to restraining in any degree the commission of genocide. [T]he obligation
to prevent genocide places a State under a duty to act which is not dependent on the
certainty that the action to be taken will succeed in preventing the commission of acts of
genocide, or even on the likelihood of that outcome.78

Do these powerful words not also apply to France and Belgium, and even the
United States, with respect to Rwanda in 1994? And what of Darfur in 2007? As for
Srebrenica itself, there is much support within the judgment for the view that
if Belgrade should have anticipated the impending atrocities in Srebrenica
in July 1995, then so too should others have done. As Judge Keith notes in his
individual opinion,
Coming closer to the time of the atrocities, not just the leadership in Belgrade but also
the wider international community was alerted to the deterioration of the security
situation in Srebrenica by Security Council resolution 1004 (1995) adopted on 12 July
1995 under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Council expressed grave concern at the
plight of the civilian population ‘‘in and around the safe area of Srebrenica.’’
It demanded, with binding force, the withdrawal of the Bosnian Serb forces from the
area and the allowing of unimpeded access for international humanitarian agencies to
the area to alleviate the plight of the civilian population.79

Certainly the Serbs in Belgrade were not the only ones who might have done more to
protect the Muslims of Srebrenica.
On this important point, the ICJ reinforces the ‘‘responsibility to protect’’ set out in
the 2005 Outcome Document of the Summit of Heads of State and Government.80 But it
goes further, elevating the duty to a treaty obligation, and one that is actionable before
the ICJ for those states that have ratified the UNCG without reservation to art. 9.
But although this development of the law is extremely welcome, the court’s refusal to
award damages is likely to discourage future recourse based upon this obligation
to prevent genocide. Rather, the court’s pronouncement strengthens arguments in
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the political sphere, which is where genocide prevention really belongs. When we
quarrel about whether genocide has taken place after the atrocities have been
committed, it is already too late.

Conclusion
For decades, human-rights lawyers have looked to art. 9 of the UNCG as a tool with
great potential. It has been cited countless times in NGO briefs and held up to cautious
states as a remedy they might invoke. There have been several applications, but
always by states directly involved in a conflict rather than by those acting erga omnes.
None has led to a very productive result. The Bosnia v. Serbia case has gone the
farthest; it generated two provisional measures requests in 1993 that arguably helped
the situation. But the final result, in February 2007, was really a setback for the
Bosnian victims, whose lawyers should have convinced the state to discontinue their
case. They probably could have obtained useful political considerations from Belgrade
in exchange, but they have now, obviously, lost that chance.
In a general sense, the ICJ opted for a restrictive and conservative construction of
the definition of genocide set out in art. 2 of the UNCG. Here it goes against the grain
of much of the academic literature, characterized by pleas to expand the categories of
groups protected by the convention, to reduce the threshold for destruction ‘‘in part,’’
and to enlarge the number of punishable acts. Some have argued this can be done by
interpretation, while others have called for amendment.81 It has always been striking
that state practice showed little or no inclination to follow these appeals. The most
dramatic example of this was the Rome Conference of June–July 1998, where the
definition of genocide drawn from the 1948 UNCG82 was incorporated into art. 6 of the
Rome Statute with virtually no objection. Only one state, Cuba, suggested that this
might be an opportunity to ‘‘improve’’ upon the old definition.83
The refusal of the Rome Conference to amend the classic definition of genocide
might seem inconsistent with its general approach to subject-matter jurisdiction.
The conference effected a dramatic rewrite and expansion of international crimes; for
example, it changed the concept of war crimes so as to include internal armed
conflict.84 Two decades earlier, in adopting Additional Protocol II to the Geneva
Conventions,85 a diplomatic conference had intentionally rejected the concept of war
crimes in internal armed conflict. As recently as 1995, distinguished scholars as well as
the International Committee of the Red Cross continued to argue that there was no
individual criminal liability under international law for war crimes committed in
internal armed conflict.86 Four judges of the ICTY Appeals Chamber disagreed, in the
first major ruling of that institution.87 Astonishingly, the Rome Conference agreed
with them, and the law changed forever.
The same amazing transformation occurred with respect to crimes against
humanity, the second of the three categories over with the ICC may exercise
jurisdiction. Since the concept of crimes against humanity was first set out in positive
law at Nuremberg, it had been dogged by the need to link such crimes with aggressive
war. As recently as 1993, the UN Security Council reaffirmed the link between crimes
against humanity and armed conflict in the text of art. 5 of the Statute of the ICTY.88
Here, too, the tribunal’s innovative judges moved the goalposts by declaring that there
was no such nexus under customary law.89 On this point, too, the Rome Conference
accepted the new approach.
Why, then, did the conference respond so differently with respect to genocide?
Many factors may contribute to an explanation, but the most plausible one is the fact
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that there was no longer any need to amend the definition of genocide. Once crimes
against humanity had been cured of its great shortcoming, the link with armed
conflict, it quickly occupied the territory that had been reserved for genocide since
1948, namely attacks on minorities committed during peacetime. Moreover, crimes
against humanity also adequately covered all those atrocities that lie on the fringes of
‘‘pure’’ genocide, such as ethnic cleansing. Thus, nobody saw any practical need for
reform, and the Rome Conference’s confirmation of the enduring nature of the 1948
genocide definition was little more than perfunctory. History helpfully explains why
the distinction between genocide and crimes against humanity was once so important,
and why it is no longer so.90
Today, there is only one difference of any significance in terms of the legal effects of
describing acts as ‘‘genocide’’ or as ‘‘crimes against humanity’’: the UNCG gives
jurisdiction to the ICJ in the event of disputes between states parties, whereas no
comparable treaty provision exists for crimes against humanity. Theoretically, even
states that have not ratified the UNCG, as long as they have accepted the general
jurisdiction of the ICJ, may be sued in that forum for serious violations of international
humanitarian law and human-rights law, as the 19 December 2005 judgment in Congo
v. Uganda demonstrated.91 But since the February 2007 decision in Bosnia v. Serbia,
most states will understand that a suit before the ICJ will succeed only in the clearest
of cases. The court seems to be saying that international criminal tribunals are the
better forum for these debates.
The ICJ’s ruling in Bosnia v. Serbia is sure to lead to criticisms that the world’s
principal judicial institution is innately conservative, a club of former legal advisors
and ambassadors zealous to protect the interests of states. That would be unfair,
because the court has distinguished itself in recent years with important judgments
that have advanced the law of human rights in significant respects. With Bosnia v.
Serbia, its close adherence to the findings of the ICTY leaves it on reliable ground.
Although Bosnia and Herzegovina’s claim was rejected in its essential parts, there can
be no doubt that Serbia and its proxy within Bosnia and Herzegovina were responsible
for war crimes and for crimes against humanity. Again, the ICTY jurisprudence
provides all the authority we need for such a proposition. But the claims of genocide
never quite added up (with the exception of Srebrenica), and the ICJ had the wisdom
and integrity to say as much, even if doing so might make the judges unpopular
in some circles.

Notes
1.
2.

3.

4.

Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/
(accessed 11 May 2007), arts. 92, 93.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm (accessed 9 May 2007),
art. 9.
Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pakistan v. India), Pleadings, Oral Arguments,
Documents. Accusations of state responsibility for genocide are as old as the UNCG itself.
Even during drafting of the UNCG, in 1948, Pakistan accused India of genocide, notably by
Sikhs and Hindus directed against Muslims: UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.63 (Ikramullah, Pakistan).
See India’s response (UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.64 (Sundaram, India)) and Pakistan’s diplomatic
refusal to reply (UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.65 (Bahadur Khan, Pakistan)).
Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Judgment, 26 February 2007
[Bosnia v. Serbia 2007 Judgment].
117

Genocide Studies and Prevention 2:2 August 2007

5.

6.

7.

8.
9.
10.
11.

12.
13.
14.
15.

16.

17.

UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). See William A. Schabas, The UN International Criminal
Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006).
See Peter H. F. Bekker and Paul C. Szasz, ‘‘Casenote: Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,’’ American Journal of International
Law 91 (1997): 121–57; Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, ‘‘Les ordonnances en indication
de mesures conservatoires dans l’affaire relative à l’application de la convention pour la
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and Policy 12 (1997): 299–328; Rafaëlle Maison, ‘‘Les ordonnances de la Cour international
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Judgment].
Prosecutor v. Stakic´, Judgment, ICTY-97-24-T (31 July 2003), para. 519 [Stakić Trial
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[Blagojević Trial Judgment].
Bosnia v. Serbia 2007 Judgment, paras. 186–88.
Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations
Secretary-General, Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1546 of 18 September 2004,
UN Doc. S/2005/60 (25 January 2005), para. 184, http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/
com_inq_darfur.pdf (accessed 29 May 2007) [COI Report].
Bosnia v. Serbia 2007 Judgment, para. 277; see also para. 319.
Prosecutor v. Jelisic´, Judgment, ICTY-95-10-T (14 December 1999), para. 100 [Jelisić Trial
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Judgment, ICTY-99-36-T (1 September 2004) [Brd̄anin Trial Judgment].
Bosnia v. Serbia 2007 Judgment, para. 374.
Ibid., paras. 217, 374.
120

Genocide and the International Court of Justice

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

82.
83.

84.
85.
86.

87.
88.
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The World Court’s Fractured Ruling
on Genocide
David Scheffer
Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw / Robert A. Helman Professor of
Law and Director, Center for International Human Rights,
Northwestern University School of Law
In February 2007 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered a lengthy
judgment in a major genocide case, Bosnia v. Serbia, arising from the Balkans war
of the early 1990s. Two of the ICJ’s unprecedented rulings are major advancements
for enforcement of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (UNCG). First, the Serbian state was found to be in violation of its
art. 1 obligation to prevent and punish the crime of genocide. This is a significant
boost for both the UNCG and the emerging legal principle of the responsibility to
protect civilian populations at risk of atrocity crimes. Second, the ICJ ruled that a
state, and not only individuals, can be found responsible for genocide, conspiracy to
commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to
commit genocide, or complicity in genocide. Despite these encouraging rulings,
however, the ICJ’s majority judgment exhibits several serious shortcomings.
The first is the majority’s failure to develop a state-centric methodology to
determine any inference of genocidal intent by the Serbian government. The judges
failed to obtain and examine evidence that might have pointed demonstrably to
such inference of intent. The second is the majority’s misinterpretation of the crime
of complicity in genocide, particularly as it relates to state responsibility: the
majority erroneously equated complicity with aiding and abetting and failed to
distinguish, in the context of complicity, between specific intent to commit genocide
and the motive to do so. Third, the ICJ has missed an opportunity to point out
emphatically that its finding on genocide, or the lack thereof, with respect to the
state of Serbia reveals a significant gap in international law. While constructively
finding that the UNCG can trigger state responsibility for genocide, the ICJ’s
judgment shows how deficient international law is in holding states responsible
for crimes against humanity and war crimes. One is left pondering the ‘‘what ifs’’
in the result and wondering how the international community can now move
forward to draft new treaties that would establish the means to enforce state
responsibility for all atrocity crimes.

The multiplicity of issues erupting from the recent judgment of the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) in the Case concerning the Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Serbia and Montenegro)1 leaves one pondering ‘‘what if ?’’ with the turn of every one of
the 171 single-spaced pages of the majority’s views. What if there had been a judgment
by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in
Milosˇevic´ 2 following his lengthy trial on charges of genocide, a profoundly important
judgment aborted, shortly before the trial’s end, by Slobodan Milošević’s sudden death?
What if certain evidence provided by the Serbian government to the ICTY in Milosˇevic´
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had been turned over to the ICJ for its own study? What if the ICJ had had the
jurisdiction, in Bosnia v. Serbia, to examine state responsibility for crimes against
humanity and war crimes?
Among a few of the dissenting judges, one is inspired to ask, ‘‘Whither common
sense in genocide litigation?’’ Though good-faith analysis abounds in both the
majority’s and the dissenting judges’ writings, they were constrained by the
exceptionally narrow prism of genocide through which all responsibility was judged.
There is an almost surreal texture to much of the majority judgment, in particular—as
if the judges were mesmerized by the fog of the evidence presented to them rather than
being enlightened by the overall reality of what occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina
from 1991 through 1995, which the whole world witnessed, and by the way
governments, and not just individuals, dictated the carnage. I write these words
knowing full well that the judges are duty bound to evaluate the evidence, or lack
thereof, and not to speculate as to the facts or extend themselves beyond the
jurisdictional boundaries of the parties’ applications. But in the realm of genocide, the
ICJ lost itself in a thicket of legal reasoning strangely distant from reality.
There is no question that the ICJ’s majority judgment contains two very significant
advancements for the enforcement of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG).3 The first such development is the
unprecedented finding that Serbia failed in its art. 1 obligation to prevent and punish
the crime of genocide.4 The emerging legal principle of the responsibility to protect
civilian populations at risk of atrocity crimes5 will be greatly strengthened as
governments weigh the possible consequences of failing to take action to prevent
genocide, particularly when instructed to do so in ICJ provisional measures, or of
failing to punish those individuals responsible for the crime. It is to be hoped that the
ICJ’s judgment will inspire national legal systems—and, ultimately, lead to future
legislation and judicial decisions—to hold their own governments to the high standard
of prevention and punishment now reflected in the ICJ’s enforcement of the UNCG.
The judgment may also inspire further applications to the ICJ to address other failures
by states parties to the UNCG to exercise their responsibility to prevent and punish
the crime of genocide.
The second critical achievement of the majority judgment is the recognition that a
state, not just an individual, can be held responsible under the UNCG for genocide,
conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide,
attempt to commit genocide, or complicity in genocide.6 The confusion over whether
the convention reaches to state responsibility, particularly beyond art. 1 obligations,
has been ended by the majority.7 Several judges disagreed,8 and scholars will doubtless
continue to debate the point. But I for one am relieved that the ICJ delivered the
fundamental reality check that, obviously and logically, the UNCG covers state
responsibility. The alternative interpretation—that the drafting history and text of the
convention reflect no such intention—is important to reflect upon, but it is a perverse
distortion of how, in most instances, individuals actually commit the crime of genocide:
they do so as agents of a state, which cannot itself escape responsibility without
rendering the UNCG little more than a shield for state-sponsored genocide.
In this article, however, I want to focus on some serious shortcomings in the ICJ’s
majority judgment in Bosnia v. Serbia. The first is the majority’s failure to infer
genocidal intent on the part of the Serbian government and to obtain and examine
evidence that might have pointed demonstrably at least to such inference of intent.
The second is the majority’s interpretation of the crime of complicity in genocide,
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particularly as it relates to state responsibility. Third, the elephant in the room that
cripples the ICJ’s ability to properly determine state responsibility beyond the UNCG
is the lack of any comparable international treaty covering crimes against humanity
and war crimes. The result is an artificial exercise in legal masochism that has the
practical effect of absolving a government of its responsibility for atrocity crimes
simply because codified criteria for the crime of genocide have not been met.
Nothing exists in treaty law to bridge the enormous gap between the criminal law
covering individuals and the void that enables outrageous state-sponsored or stateinfluenced conduct (other than genocide) to go unchecked in courts of law.

The ICJ’s Failure to Infer the Intent to Commit Genocide
Rather than investigate and analyze the totality of violent events that engulfed the
people of Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1991 and 1995, the ICJ chose to
disaggregate its analysis into an investigation of whether, for each individual incident
presented as evidence to the court, the specific intent required for a finding of the
crime of genocide could be conclusively shown.9 Central to the court’s failure to
establish specific intent was the fact that it did not find such necessary intent for any
individual engaged in any specific incident other than the Srebrenica massacres of
July 1995. The majority relied heavily on the jurisprudence of the ICTY, which
prosecutes only individuals and which has not found the requisite intent to commit
genocide except in the Krstic´ judgment pertaining to Srebrenica.10 The high standard
of proof for establishing the specific intent of genocide under principles of individual
criminal responsibility does not necessarily hold for state responsibility, where the
standard of proof is necessarily of a different character than that applied to individual
perpetrators confronting a loss of liberty, or possibly even a death sentence,
as punishment.
At one point the ICJ quotes the famous dictum from the Nuremberg trials, that
‘‘[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract
entities . . .’’11 Yet the majority shrank from the equally important truth that it had
largely established (albeit with the terminology of state responsibility) earlier in its
judgment: atrocity crimes are committed by governments and other abstract entities,
and only rarely by men alone. In order to properly analyze whether a government or
any part thereof acted with the specific intent to commit genocide, the most plausible
methodology is to establish the inference of specific intent by examining the evidence
of a multiplicity and pattern of events and then understanding how such events can be
explained by exposing direct and indirect linkages to the suspect government.
A mystery tour through the psyches of political or military leaders is not essential to
the task of discovering the requisite mens rea of inferential intent for state-sponsored
genocide.
There is nothing revolutionary in establishing the inference of intent as the mens
rea of genocide. The ad hoc tribunals have been discovering inferred intent of genocide
with respect to individuals for years.12 There is no reason that the ICJ could not have
employed a similar methodology, adjusted for state-centric analysis, with respect to
Serbia and Montenegro. Unfortunately, the majority searched for the inference of
intent as if it were discoverable only by examining individual perpetrators (in the
spirit of the ad hoc tribunals) and determining whether and how each person’s
intentions could be inferred. Failing to meet that identical test for a state, the ICJ
surrendered the playing field to the complexity of the crime itself. The court failed to
employ any methodology that seeks evidence of the inference of intent to commit
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genocide in the actions, events, circumstances, policies, omissions, and rhetoric of a
government acting in its collective capacity, notwithstanding that an individual leader
may be targeted for criminal responsibility before a separate court of criminal
jurisdiction.
Significantly, as discussed above, the majority judgment confirms a key principle:
there is authority in the UNCG for the finding of state responsibility for the crime of
genocide, albeit not as a matter of criminal culpability but only as ‘‘the responsibility
of States simpliciter.’’13 In critical part,
Accordingly, having considered the various arguments, the Court affirms that the
Contracting Parties are bound by the obligation under the Convention not to commit,
through their organs or persons or groups whose conduct is attributable to them,
genocide and the other acts enumerated in Article III. Thus if an organ of the State, or a
person or group whose acts are legally attributable to the State, commits any of the acts
proscribed by Article III of the Convention, the international responsibility of that
State is incurred.14

The logic behind this finding does not point only to the broader interpretation of the
UNCG as a legal instrument of accountability for states as well as individuals. There
also is the pragmatic reality that the convention can achieve this broader
interpretation only if the specific-intent requirement for the crime of genocide is one
that can be inferred with respect to the overall conduct (at least extending
beyond individual incidents to an aggregate of incidents) of a government bound by
the treaty.
However, the majority in Bosnia v. Serbia concludes that, ‘‘save for the events of
July 1995 at Srebrenica, the necessary intent required to constitute genocide has not
been conclusively shown in relation to each specific intent.’’15 They establish three
avenues by which such evidence could be demonstrated: (1) on the part of the
individual perpetrators, although that would not necessarily demonstrate governmental responsibility; (2) on the basis of a concerted plan; or (3) on the basis that the
events reviewed in the matter reveal a consistent pattern of conduct that can only
point to the existence of such intent.16 Because the focus of intent was shifted from the
individual perpetrators (option 1) to higher governmental authority or to the Serbian
government itself (options 2 and 3), Bosnia had to show either an official statement of
aims reflecting a genocidal intent or a pattern of conduct. The court found
unpersuasive the evidence presented under either requirement. But the court suffered
from its own investigative shortcomings and its inability, or unwillingness, to connect
the dots with the kind of reasoned analysis one might have expected of the highest
court of international law.
The key paragraphs (370–76) of the majority’s decision hardly demonstrate the
kind of rigorous investigative and analytical exercise required to establish whether a
government’s specific intent to commit genocide can be inferred. As the ICJ notes,
Bosnia’s assertions shift from the intent of individual perpetrators to the intent of
higher authority.17 A singular truth about inference of intent is that clear and
unambiguous statements of intent, including in any official statement of aims, likely
will not be found. So when the court noticed that, in Republika Srpska President
Momcilo Krajisnik’s Decision on Strategic Goals of 12 May 1992, the ‘‘objectives do not
include the elimination of the Bosnian Muslim population,’’ one gropes for a reality
check. Would it surprise anyone that there is no such blatant statement in writing?!
Of course the document ‘‘does not necessarily involve the intent to destroy in whole or
in part the Muslim population in the enclaves,’’ as the majority held (emphasis added).
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But if one combines the highly suggestive (shall we say coded?) signals sent in that
particular document with the cascade of murderous and destructive operations on the
ground over a number of years, the uniquely integrated character of Serb and Bosnian
Serb military forces, and the many journeys of Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić
back and forth to Belgrade to check in with the Serb leadership, the strong possibility,
if not reality, of genocide knocks very loudly at the ICJ’s door.
The court bends over backward to presume a different intent by the Bosnian Serb
leadership—namely, the expulsion of the Bosnian Muslims and other communities.18
That discretionary choice could have gone the other way, with the court leaning toward
a presumption of intent to commit genocide on the part of the Bosnian Serb leaders and
then investigating their linkages to the Belgrade leadership. The court notes that the
ICTY has not characterized the Strategic Goals as genocidal, which certainly is
interesting, but in the context of state responsibility the ICTY’s findings are a footnote.
The real story, which the ICJ failed to investigate, is how the Strategic Goals form part
of a larger mosaic of policy statements, leadership rhetoric, and collaborative
relationships and conduct (including the failure to act at critical stages) between
Belgrade and Pale, and their respective militaries, over a number of years.19 This is
where the evidence held by the ICTY in the Milosˇević case might have proved critical,
if only the ICJ had been more aggressive and more patient in seeking to acquire it.20
What if, for example, the ICJ had dared to subpoena Serbia for the critical minutes of
its Supreme Defense Council? What if the ICJ had sought the assistance of major
governments to pressure Belgrade to authorize the ICTY to release the Serbian
government documents it held in the Milosˇević case to the ICJ, in their entirety and
unredacted? Under the Statute of the ICJ, the court has clear authority to investigate
and proactively seek such evidence,21 yet there appears to have been no discernible
action on the part of the court to obtain this evidence.22 Sadly, the passive character
of the ICJ’s investigative endeavors reflects an entrenched habit.
There also was no attempt by the ICJ to examine the totality of the evidence
presented during the Milosˇevic´ trial and determine whether such evidence might point
to Serbian state responsibility for actions that might have been interpreted as part of a
genocidal campaign in Bosnia. The fact that Slobodan Milošević died before judgment
was rendered in his trial does not negate the existence of such evidence. His untimely
death simply means that a final judgment will never be reached on his personal
conduct. But there is a wealth of evidence from his trial that the ICJ, examining state
conduct, would find very instructive. The Milosˇevic´ trial testimony of former US
general Wesley Clark, which recounts his conversation with Milošević during the
Dayton peace talks in late 1995,23 is used by the ICJ majority only to help prove that
Serbia failed in its state responsibility to prevent the genocide at Srebrenica.24
Yet Clark’s exchange with Milošević could have pointed to broader state responsibility
behind the genocide at Srebrenica if examined as part of a larger tapestry of
statements and actions.25
Another example of highly suspect Serbian connections with the Srebrenica
genocide involved the actions of the ‘‘Scorpions,’’ their description as ‘‘a unit of Ministry
of Interiors [sic] of Serbia,’’ and a videotape showing a Scorpion paramilitary unit
leading six Muslim prisoners—young men and boys—off to their deaths.26 Presented
in this context was the declaration made by the Council of Ministers of Serbia on
15 June 2005, which read in part,
Those who committed the killings in Srebrenica, as well as those who ordered and
organized that massacre represented neither Serbia nor Montenegro, but an
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undemocratic regime of terror and death, against whom the majority of citizens of
Serbia and Montenegro put up the strongest resistance.27

That declaration should have set off some alarm bells in the Peace Palace, warning the
court to dig deeper, much deeper, to find evidence of Serbian government complicity, at
a minimum, in the genocide at Srebrenica and perhaps beyond. Instead, the ICJ
majority considered the statement to be a political one that does not constitute an
admission of responsibility for the Srebrenica massacres.28
The easiest analysis of the Clark–Milošević exchange and the actions of the
Scorpions at Srebrenica is to take them in isolation, as the majority did, and to show
how neither demonstrates conclusively either direct or inferential genocidal intent.
The harder, but more important, analysis would be to weave these two events into a
more comprehensive and coherent study of the years of collaborative actions and
omissions facilitating genocide that may have existed between some Bosnian Serb
leaders and some Serbian leaders in Belgrade. The ICJ analysis is reminiscent of how
the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur looked at certain isolated events
and the identities of certain victims and concluded that neither genocide nor even any
genocidal policy existed with respect to Darfur.29 If one were to search for an easy way
for judges and lawyers to avoid the reality of state responsibility for genocide, both the
ICJ majority and the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur discovered it in
spades—to the detriment of genocide studies, UNCG enforcement, and genocide
prevention for years to come.
The ICJ’s third option for discovering the specific intent of a state is framed with
an almost impossible standard of proof:
The dolus specialis, the specific intent to destroy the group in whole or in part, has to be
convincingly shown by reference to particular circumstances, unless a general plan to
that end can be convincingly demonstrated to exist; and for a pattern of conduct to
be accepted as evidence of its existence, it would have to be such that it could only point
to the existence of such intent.30

One might interpret this view to mean that only the intent to commit genocide must
explain the atrocity. There are clear precedents of genocide in world history, but to
state that a pattern of conduct can be ruled as genocide provided that its only
characteristic is that of genocide would be patently absurd. One must presume that,
while the ICJ would require that an intent to commit genocide be demonstrated in
order to hold a state responsible for genocide, the elements of crimes against humanity
and war crimes might also be found relating to the same situation under scrutiny.
Unfortunately, the ICJ may have delivered the impression—if not an outright
ruling—that only genocide must constitute the state’s intended action.
The ICJ dismisses this third option by concluding that its failure to find the specific
intent of genocide by the perpetrators of individual atrocities complained of by Bosnia,
as well as the ICTY’s record of no convictions on genocide other than for Srebrenica,
fails to establish intent on the part of the Serbian government.31 There is no attempt
by the ICJ to understand what the aggregate of ‘‘widespread and serious atrocities’’
might mean in interpreting a government’s overall policy and the inferences that could
be drawn from it. The result of such an exercise may be that no inferential intent to
commit genocide existed in Belgrade from 1991 to 1995. But one would have expected
the ICJ to make a serious effort to determine any such inferential intent, even if that
meant traversing new terrain in ICJ jurisprudence to create a methodology that not
only is faithful to the totality of facts but also understands that there is a distinction
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between how one judges a government’s performance and how one judges that of an
individual perpetrator. As ICJ Vice-President Al-Khasawneh writes in dissent,
[T]he Court has refused to infer genocidal intent from the consistent pattern of conduct
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In its reasoning, the Court relies heavily on several
arguments, each of which is inadequate for the purpose, and contradictory to the
consistent jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals.32

Essentially, the ICJ sought to find governmental responsibility by building a pyramid
of incidents revealing the specific intent to commit genocide—and only genocide—by
individual perpetrators, all of whom must be associated with the respondent
government, Serbia. A far more pragmatic methodology would be to require proof of
the inference of genocidal intent through the totality of atrocities and how they could
be plausibly understood as the natural consequence of specific intent within and by the
government to commit genocide.

Complicity in Genocide
The ICJ’s failure to conduct a proper examination of the inference of intent to commit
genocide is directly tied to another significant failure: the court’s flawed examination
of complicity in the commission of genocide. I would argue that the two exercises—
establishing the inference of a government’s intent and finding complicity—are deeply
intertwined analytical exercises and can point to state responsibility if properly
undertaken.
The court sought to interpret complicity by referring to the International Law
Commission’s proposed articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts (particularly art. 16),33 then erroneously using that document to
define complicity of a state in committing genocide.34 The two bodies of principles—the
first not having been brought into force by treaty law or enforceable as customary
international law, the second being both treaty law and customary international law—
are apples and oranges. Even if some may conclude that the ILC was attempting to
establish state responsibility for criminal conduct, including genocide, in drafting the
articles on state responsibility, the ILC did not, and has not yet, supplanted the UNCG
in determining the commission of genocide and how it was perpetrated and
facilitated.35 Yet the ICJ finds no reason
to make any distinction of substance between ‘‘complicity in genocide,’’ within the
meaning of Article III, paragraph (e), of the Convention, and the ‘‘aid or assistance’’ of a
State in the commission of a wrongful act by another State within the meaning of the
aforementioned Article 16.36

This conclusion is highly suspect and reflects a misguided reliance on a source—Article
16 of the ILC document—that has no legal standing and yet plays a leading role in the
court’s investigation of the crime of genocide. According to the ICJ, the key test for
complicity in genocide requires the court to ‘‘examine whether organs of the
Respondent State, or persons acting on its instructions or under its direction or
effective control, furnished ‘aid or assistance’ in the commission of the genocide in
Srebrenica, in a sense not significantly different from that of those concepts in the
general law of international responsibility.’’37 By equating complicity in genocide with
aiding and abetting genocide, the ICJ has erroneously imposed upon the crime of
complicity in genocide the standard required of one who aids or abets, the latter of
which requires that there be a sharing of the principal perpetrator’s intent and
motive to commit genocide.
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A more faithful reading and understanding of complicity in genocide distinguishes
between specific intent and specific motive.38 There is no question that the perpetrator
of genocide must possess both the specific intent to destroy in whole or in part a
protected group (sharing national, ethnic, racial, or religious character) and the
specific motive to do so because of the group’s identity as such. The ‘‘as such’’
requirement in art. 2 of the UNCG has always been its most distinguishing
characteristic. In other words, it is because the group is of a single identity (national,
ethnic, racial, or religious) that the perpetrator exercises the intent to destroy it.
An aider or abettor of the perpetrator of genocide also shares the perpetrator’s
intention and motive to destroy the protected group. But if the protected group
occupies territory sought by the perpetrator and is attacked solely to clear the territory
of that group, then the discriminatory motive required by the UNCG would be missing
(and a prosecutor might turn to crimes against humanity as the applicable criminal
charge).
In contrast, the motive to destroy one of the protected groups as such need not be
present for complicity in genocide. Like the crime of genocide, however, the intention to
destroy in whole or in part a protected group must exist, whether the perpetrator is an
individual or a government being complicit in genocide. Indeed, it is the absence of
motive that is the raison d’eˆtre for the stand-alone crime of complicity in genocide and
distinguishes it from aiding and abetting genocide.39 This is particularly true of
governmental, as distinguished from individual, conduct. The ICJ should have
examined more diligently whether the Serbian government provided significant
support to the Bosnian Serbs from 1991 through 1995 knowing that such support
would facilitate the genocidal aims of Bosnian Serb leaders but not necessarily sharing
the motive to destroy any protected group (Bosnian Muslims) as such. Since the ICTY
found that in Srebrenica the crime of genocide was committed by at least one
individual, Bosnian Serb General Radislav Krstić (as an aider and abettor of the
crime), the real question should have been whether the Serbian government facilitated
genocide at Srebrenica through acts of complicity, not whether or not it perpetrated
genocide.
The test for Bosnia would have been to prove before the ICJ that the Serbian
government intended to destroy Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica for the purpose of
removing them from Srebrenica, not because of their protected group identity as
such.40 The Bosnian Serb forces, as well as units like the Scorpions, were the vehicles
for the activation of that intent, and yet the Serbian government need not be shown to
share both the intent and the motive of the Bosnian Serb forces. Therefore, it would
have been sufficient to show (1) that the Serbian government intended to destroy the
Bosnian Muslims, in whole or in part, for strategic purposes (such as the ultimate
creation of a larger Serbian state) and (2) that actions supporting such intent
facilitated the perpetrators of genocide on the ground in Bosnia, who were exercising
their own intention to destroy the Bosnian Muslims, in whole or in part, because
of their religious or ethnic identity as such (and that the Serbian government was
aware of that particular Bosnian Serb motive). This is not to conclude that the ICJ,
after reviewing a more substantial body of evidence, would necessarily have found the
Serbian government responsible for complicity in genocide. But the proper analytical
methodology was never applied to determine whether or not such state responsibility
existed.
The object and purpose of the UNCG to ‘‘prevent and to punish’’ the crime of
genocide would be severely undermined if government leaders, such as those
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of Serbia and Montenegro in the early 1990s, knew that so long as they did not exhibit
both the intent to destroy a protected group, in whole or in part, and the motive to
destroy such a group because of its group identity, then their government would be free
to facilitate the crime of genocide without incurring any consequence under arts. 2 or 3
of the UNCG. Indeed, under the ICJ’s analysis, a government could avoid a technical
finding of complicity in genocide and subsequently punish (or help others to punish) a
few individuals as individual perpetrators, without ever incurring state responsibility
under the law for facilitating, with specific intent, a genocidal campaign of
extraordinary gravity and consequence. In the end, the government’s objective
of genocidal slaughters could be accomplished without establishing any state
responsibility under the UNCG. Yet the same government could redeem itself under
the convention’s art. 1 responsibility by prosecuting (or helping others to capture and
prosecute) a few fall guys (and, perhaps, who knows, making sure their families lived
comfortably and happily ever after). This may indeed be the outcome if Belgrade
finally turns Ratko Mladić over to the ICTY and, having avoided state responsibility
for complicity in genocide, demonstrates its compliance with the ICJ’s judgment that
it must follow through on its responsibility to punish under art. 1 of the UNCG.

The Elephant in the Room
A broad swath of the majority’s judgment describes atrocities in Bosnia and
Herzegovina that the Bosnian government presented as evidence to the court.41
The majority relied heavily on the ICTY’s examination of such evidence in cases for
individual criminal responsibility heard by that tribunal. In no event, including
Srebrenica, did the ICJ find the necessary specific intent to commit genocide on the part
of the Serbian government. However, the court repeatedly inferred that a different
conclusion might have been reached had it had jurisdiction to examine the same events
through the prism of crimes against humanity or war crimes.42 In the absence of
the high hurdle imposed by the specific intent requirement of genocide, it would
probably have been easier to establish the responsibility of the Serbian government for
the other atrocity crimes suggested by the court in the majority judgment.
Thus, if the court had had the opportunity to adjudicate not only allegations of
genocide but also allegations of crimes against humanity and war crimes for which the
Serbian government bears direct or indirect state responsibility, then the world might
have read a very different, and more realistic, judgment by the ICJ majority on
26 February 2007. It would have been instructive to the international community for
the majority to point out this factor more emphatically in its decision, at least as a
‘‘what if ’’ scenario that it might have acknowledged it was precluded from exploring for
jurisdictional reasons. In fact, however, we are left with the misleading impression
that a judicial ruling has been made that Serbia as a state committed no crimes,
because the ICJ majority found that it did not commit genocide. But what if the
Serbian government perpetrated, or facilitated the commission of, crimes against
humanity or war crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Imagine how different the ICJ’s
judgment might have been if it had the jurisdiction to explore allegations relating
to these categories of atrocity crimes.
The majority decision in Bosnia v. Serbia places in sharp focus the entire dilemma
posed by the constraints of the UNCG in the realm of atrocity crimes and the need to
establish state responsibility, with requisite penalties under the law, for crimes
against humanity and serious war crimes. No international treaty exists for the
totality of crimes against humanity that is comparable to the UNCG’s coverage of the
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crime of genocide. As for war crimes, the Geneva Conventions of 194943 and the 1977
Additional Protocols I and II44 do not contain compromissory clauses granting
jurisdiction to the ICJ to adjudicate any dispute between or among states parties
regarding the interpretation or application of the relevant treaty. Each of the Geneva
Conventions treats violations of its provisions in a strictly collaborative manner,
beginning with an inquiry, the procedure for which is either agreed upon by the
interested parties or decided by an umpire selected by agreement among the interested
parties. The relevant Geneva Convention then states, ‘‘Once the violation has been
established, the Parties to the conflict shall put an end to it and shall repress it with
the least possible delay.’’45 Nothing more is said about the state’s responsibility or
about what court, if any, has jurisdiction to adjudicate an allegation of a state party’s
non-compliance with the relevant Geneva Convention.
Significantly, Additional Protocol I requires that
A Party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the Conventions or of this
Protocol shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible
for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.46

Nonetheless, neither the ICJ nor any other international court is granted any
jurisdiction to adjudicate claims of governmental non-compliance with either
Additional Protocol I or Additional Protocol II. The only clear way to seek payment
of compensation for a violation as described in Protocol I would be through political,
or perhaps economic or military, pressure.
Despite its historic confirmation that states can be held responsible for the crime of
genocide under the UNCG, the ICJ’s judgment in Bosnia v. Serbia reveals a major gap
in the international law of state responsibility: There is no codified enforcement
mechanism to hold states accountable for crimes against humanity and war crimes,
which typically originate in and are managed by governments and are unleashed more
frequently than genocide. These other atrocity crimes can be prosecuted against
individuals in the ICC and in other international and hybrid criminal tribunals, but
they remain strangely alien to forums of state responsibility.
The needs of international society have come full circle. State conduct was
historically the central concern, and it has become so again. State responsibility
requires a new codification exercise for crimes against humanity and war crimes, so
that states can be held accountable for such crimes under the law in the same manner
as the UNCG enables for state responsibility for genocide. In light of the convention’s
precedent and of the judgments of the international and hybrid criminal tribunals, the
task is theoretically plausible. Capturing the political will to further discipline states
in their conduct toward civilian populations and foreign military forces will be the
greatest challenge. My bet is on the inevitability of the endeavor.
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knowledge of the genocide set to unfold in Srebrenica. Taken together, these facts clearly
establish that Belgrade was, if not fully integrated in, then fully aware of the decisionmaking processes regarding Srebrenica, while the Republika Srpska itself was excluded.
Even after the fact, negotiations following the fall of Srebrenica and the genocide
committed there were held simultaneously with General Mladić and President Milošević.
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2(a) of the UNCG, ‘‘the Court finds that it is established by overwhelming evidence that
massive killings in specific areas and detention camps throughout the territory of Bosnia
and Herzegovina were perpetrated during the conflict. . . . The Court thus finds that it has
been established by conclusive evidence that massive killings of members of the protected
group occurred and that therefore the requirements of the material element, as defined by
Article II(a) of the Convention, are fulfilled. . . . The Court is however not convinced, on the
basis of the evidence before it, that it has been conclusively established that the massive
killings of members of the protected group were committed with the specific intent
(dolus specialis) on the part of the perpetrators to destroy, in whole or in part, the group as
such. The Court has carefully examined the criminal proceedings of the ICTY and the
findings of its Chambers, cited above [in the judgment], and observes that none of those
convicted were found to have acted with specific intent (dolus specialis). The killings
outlined above [in the judgment] may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity,
but the Court has no jurisdiction to determine whether this is so. In the exercise of its
jurisdiction under the Genocide Convention, the Court finds that it has not been
established by the Applicant that the killings amounted to acts of genocide prohibited
by the Convention.’’ Bosnia v. Serbia, paras. 276–77.
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. (1950) 31 [First Geneva Convention]; Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. (1950) 85 [Second Geneva Convention];
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. (1950)
135 [Third Geneva Convention]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. (1950) 287 [Fourth Geneva Convention].
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 12 December 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
(1979) 3 [Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts,
12 December 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. (1979) 609 [Additional Protocol II].
See First Geneva Convention, art. 52; Second Geneva Convention, art. 53; Third Geneva
Convention, art. 132; Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 149.
Additional Protocol I, art. 91. Additional Protocol II contains no comparable compensation
provision.
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The Istanbul Pogrom of 6–7 September
1955 in the Light of International Law
Alfred de Zayas
Geneva School of Diplomacy
The Istanbul pogrom (sometimes referred to as Septemvriana) was a governmentinstigated series of riots against the Greek minority of Istanbul in September 1955.
It can be characterized as a ‘‘crime against humanity,’’ comparable in scope to the
November 1938 Kristallnacht in Germany, perpetrated by the Nazi authorities
against Jewish civilians.
The Septemvriana satisfies the criteria of article 2 of the 1948 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) because the ‘‘intent
to destroy in whole or in part’’ the Greek minority in Istanbul was demonstrably
present, the pogrom having been orchestrated by the government of Turkish Prime
Minister Adnan Menderes. Even if the number of deaths (estimated at thirty-seven)
among members of the Greek community was relatively low, the result of the
pogrom was the flight and emigration of the Greek minority of Istanbul, which once
numbered some 100,000 and was subsequently reduced to a few thousand. The vast
destruction of Greek property, businesses, and churches provides evidence of the
Turkish authorities’ intent to terrorize the Greeks in Istanbul into abandoning the
territory, thus eliminating the Greek minority. This practice falls within the ambit
of the crime of ‘‘ethnic cleansing,’’ which the UN General Assembly and the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia have interpreted as
constituting a form of genocide.
Turkey has been a party to the UNCG since 1950. Although it is not a party to the
1968 Convention on the Non-applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes
and Crimes against Humanity, modern international law imposes the principle of
non-prescription to genocide and crimes against humanity. Accordingly, the
obligation to punish the guilty and the responsibility of Turkey to make reparations
to the victims and their survivors have not lapsed.
Seen in isolation, the Istanbul pogrom can be considered a grave crime under both
Turkish domestic law and international law. In the historical context of a religiondriven eliminationist process accompanied by many pogroms before, during, and
after World War I within the territories of the Ottoman Empire, including the
destruction of the Greek communities of Pontos and Asia Minor and the atrocities
against the Greeks of Smyrna in September 1922, the genocidal character of the
Istanbul pogrom becomes apparent. It should be noted, however, that whereas the
characterization of the Septemvriana as a form of genocide lends it greater
emotional impact, the legal consequences are essentially the same whether the
pogrom is classified under the rubric of genocide or as a crime against humanity.

Historical Overview
On 6–7 September 1955 violent riots (sometimes referred to as Septemvriana) occurred
against the Greek minority living in Istanbul. The event was comparable in scope to
Alfred de Zayas, ‘‘The Istanbul Pogrom of 6–7 September 1955 in the Light of
International Law.’’ Genocide Studies and Prevention 2, 2 (August 2007): 137–154. ! 2007
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the 1938 Kristallnacht1 in Germany, perpetrated by the Nazi SS and SA against
Jewish synagogues and property in November 1938. In the weeks leading up to the
Istanbul pogrom,2 Turkish authorities had engaged in systematic incitement of public
opinion against the Greek minority, partly in connection with the ongoing dispute over
Cyprus.3 A student movement calling itself Cyprus Is Turkish was particularly
virulent in creating anti-Greek propaganda. On 28 August 1955 the largest daily
newspaper, Hürriyet, threatened that ‘‘if the Greeks dare touch our brethren, then
there are plenty of Greeks in Istanbul to retaliate upon.’’4 At ten minutes past
midnight on 6 September 1955, an explosion occurred in the courtyard of the Turkish
Consulate in Thessaloniki, a building adjacent to the house where Kemal Atatürk was
born. The press immediately blamed the Greeks and published photos of Atatürk’s
house that purported to show extensive damage.5 At the 1960/1961 Yassiada trial
against Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and Foreign Minister Fatin Zorlu, it became
known that the explosion had been carried out by Turkish agents under orders from
the Turkish government.6
Beginning around 5:00 p.m.,7 Turkish mobs devastated the Greek, Armenian, and
Jewish districts of Istanbul, killing an estimated thirty-seven Greeks8 and destroying
and looting their places of worship,9 homes, and businesses. The pogrom was not
spontaneous but centrally organized: many of the rioters were recruited in Istanbul
and in the provinces by the Demokrat Parti authorities and taken into Istanbul by
train, in trucks, and by some 4,000 taxis with instructions on what to destroy and what
was to be spared.10 They were given axes, crowbars, acetylene torches, petrol,
dynamite, and large numbers of rocks in carts. Predictably, the riots got out of control,
with the mobs shouting ‘‘Evvela mal, sonra can’’ (‘‘First your property, then your
life’’).11 The Turkish militia and police who coordinated the pogrom refrained from
protecting the lives and property of the Greek victims.12 Their function was, rather,
to prevent Turkish property from being destroyed as well.
These events are best described in English by Speros Vryonis in his 2005 book
The Mechanism of Catastrophe, which also draws on a vast range of Turkish sources,
including the Yassiada trials, and on the substantive report published by Helsinki
Watch (now Human Rights Watch)13 in 1992 on violations of the human and civil
rights of the Greeks of Turkey. There is still no official Turkish government or police
report on the violence of 6–7 September 1955.
Besides the deaths, thousands were injured; some 200 Greek women were raped,14
and there are reports that Greek boys were raped as well.15 Many Greek men,
including at least one priest, were subjected to forced circumcision. The riots were
accompanied by enormous material damage,16 estimated by Greek authorities at
US$500 million, including the burning of churches and the devastation of shops17 and
private homes.18 As a result of the pogrom, the Greek minority eventually emigrated
from Turkey.19
After the fall of the Menderes government in 1960, Menderes and other organizers
of the pogrom were put on trial and convicted. The Yassiada trial of 1960/1961
provides abundant evidence as to the intent to terrorize and destroy the Greek
minority of Istanbul. Menderes, Zorlu, and their minister of economics, Hasan
Polatkan, were executed.20

Norms
Under customary international law, massacres such as occurred in Istanbul in
September 1955 constitute international crimes. There are many norms of
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international law, international humanitarian law, and international human-rights
law that are pertinent to an examination of the Istanbul pogrom. Under these norms,
the pogrom, taken in isolation, involves a multiplicity of violations of international law.
But it is in historical context that the Istanbul pogrom emerges as part of a genocidal
program aimed at the destruction of the Greek presence in all territories under
Turkish rule.
Massacres committed by the Ottoman authorities against the Armenians during
World War I were labeled ‘‘crimes against humanity and civilization’’ by the
British and the French governments as early as 1915.21 At the end of World War I,
the victorious Allies agreed that the atrocities committed against the Christian
minorities under Ottoman rule—including the Armenians; the Greeks of Pontos,
Asia Minor, and Eastern Thrace; and the Assyrians—should be investigated
and punished and that the material damage should be compensated. Relevant
precedents are article 230 of the Treaty of Sèvres,22 which stipulated the obligation
to punish, and art. 144, which stipulated the obligation to grant restitution
and compensation.23
Although the Ottoman state signed the Treaty of Sèvres, formal ratification never
followed, and the Allies did not follow through to ensure its implementation.24 Such
failure can be attributed to the growing international political disarray following
World War I, the rise of Soviet Russia, the withdrawal of the British military presence
from Turkey,25 the isolationist policies of the United States,26 the demise of the Young
Turk regime, and the rise of Kemalism in Turkey. Nevertheless, the criminality of the
massacres against Armenians, Greeks, and Assyrians had been acknowledged by the
international community, even though no Turkish official was ever tried before an
international tribunal and only a few were indicted, tried, and convicted by Turkish
courts-martial.
The term ‘‘genocide’’ was coined by the Polish jurist Raphael Lemkin in 1944 in
connection with the Nazi murder of the Jews. The London Agreement of 8 August 1945
laid down the indictment for the Nuremberg trials, including the offense of ‘‘crimes
against humanity’’ under art. 6(c) of the Nuremberg Statute.27
The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(UNCG)28 did not create the crime of genocide, but it formalized and codified the
international prohibition of massacres. Article 1 of the UNCG stipulates that
‘‘genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under
international law’’; art. 2 provides that
genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part

Turkey acceded to the convention on 31 July 1950, more than five years before the
events of September 1955.
Of crucial importance here is the international rule of non-prescription, reflected
in art. 1 of the UN Convention on the Non-applicability of Statutory Limitations to
War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity,29 according to which the passage of time
does not extinguish the obligation to prosecute in cases of genocide and crimes against
humanity. As a consequence of this same principle, the passage of time does not
extinguish the justiciability of claims to restitution. Moreover, there is an obligation
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erga omnes30 not to recognize the material consequences of genocide and crimes
against humanity.
International law has continued its normative development in this direction.
For example, although the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) has no jurisdiction in connection with the Istanbul pogrom, it expands our
understanding of the concept of genocide and its criminalization. Thus, art. 4 of the
1993 Statute of the ICTY defines the crime of genocide, and art. 5(g) lists rape as a
‘‘crime against humanity.’’31
Similarly, art. 6 of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) defines genocide in the terms of the UNCG; art. 7 defines ‘‘crimes against
humanity’’ in terms more explicit than those in the Nuremberg Statute.32 However,
pursuant to art. 11 of the statute, the ICC shall have no competence ratione temporis to
examine events that occurred prior to the entry into force of the statute on 1 July 2002.
In the domain of ‘‘soft law,’’ it is important to recall that in 1992 the UN General
Assembly adopted Resolution 47/121, stipulating that the Yugoslav policy of ‘‘ethnic
cleansing’’ was a ‘‘form of genocide’’;33 in 1995 the General Assembly adopted
Resolution 50/192, which addresses the systematic practice of rape in the context
of ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ and reaffirms
that rape in the conduct of armed conflict constitutes a war crime and that under
certain circumstances it constitutes a crime against humanity and an act of genocide
as defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide.34

In the field of international human-rights law, Turkey has been a party to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) since 15 September
2003.35 Article 6 protects the right to life; art. 20 prohibits incitement to racial hatred
and incitement to violence; art. 26 prohibits discrimination; and art. 27 guarantees the
rights of minorities. In November 2006 Turkey also ratified the Optional Protocol to
ICCPR, but added a reservation precluding its retroactive application. In regional
international law, Turkey signed the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms on 4 November 1950 and ratified it on 18 May 1954.36 Turkey
also ratified Protocol I on 22 June 1953. The European Convention protects the right to
life, and its Protocol I protects the right to property. The 1955 pogrom should thus also
be viewed from the perspective of international human-rights law.

Case Law
Bearing in mind that law is not mathematics, judges have to determine how the norms
apply to a particular set of facts. While one judge may conclude that a pogrom
constitutes genocide, another may conclude that it does not go over the threshold.
But since a pogrom entails multiple violations of general principles of law and of
human-rights law, the obligation to punish the guilty and to provide reparation to the
victims is essentially the same.
The Nuremberg judgment of 1946 convicted the Nazis of crimes against humanity,
including genocide.37 Massacres against a state’s own citizens and permanent
residents, such as the victims of the Kristallnacht of 9–10 November 1938, were also
deemed to constitute a ‘‘crime against humanity.’’38
The ICTY has applied the concept of ‘‘genocide’’ to individual massacres and
determined, in the judgment against General Radislav Krstić,39 that the massacre
of Srebrenica constituted genocide.40 However, not every individual or political
authority associated with the Srebrenica massacre has been charged with or
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convicted of genocide. The ICTY has also held that rape can in certain circumstances
constitute the crime of genocide,41 and in its 2001 judgment against Kunarac, Kovac,
and Vucovic, the ICTY also found that rape constitutes a ‘‘crime against humanity.’’42
The principal architects of the Istanbul pogroms were tried, convicted, and
punished under Turkish law in 1961. Former prime minister Menderes and a total
of 592 other individuals were charged at the Yassiada trials in 1960/1961.
The documentation and testimony emerging from this trial are sufficient to establish
the ‘‘intent’’ of the Menderes government to ‘‘destroy in whole or in part’’ the
Greek minority in Istanbul.43

The Doctrine of State Responsibility for Wrongful Acts
A general principle of international law stipulates that a state is responsible for
injuries caused by its wrongful acts and must provide reparation for such injury.44
The Permanent Court of International Justice enunciated this principle in the
Chorzow Factory Case as follows: ‘‘it is a principle of international law, and even a
general conception of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to
make reparation.’’45
It should be stressed that the wrong in question is no mere violation of
international law engaging interstate responsibility but the gravest criminal violation
of international law, engaging, as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has
determined, international responsibility erga omnes—an obligation of the state toward
the international community as a whole.
Thus, the international crime of genocide imposes obligations not only on the state
that perpetrated the genocide but also on the entire international community: (a) not
to recognize as legal a situation created by an international crime, (b) not to assist the
author of an international crime in maintaining the illegal situation, and (c) to assist
other states in the implementation of the aforementioned obligations.46 In a very real
sense, the legal impact of the erga omnes nature of the crime of genocide goes far
beyond the mere retroactivity of application of the UNCG: it imposes an affirmative
obligation on the international community not to recognize an illegal situation
resulting from genocide.

Imprescriptibility of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity
When, in 1968, the United Nations drafted the Convention on the Non-Applicability
of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, it
clearly and deliberately pronounced its retroactive application. Article 1 stipulates
that
No statutory limitation shall apply to the following crimes, irrespective of the date of
their commission . . . crimes against humanity, whether committed in time of war or in
time of peace as they are defined in the charter of the International Military Tribunal,
Nürnberg, of 8 August 1945 . . . and the crime of genocide as defined in the 1948
Convention.’’47

The principle of nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege praevia (no crime
without law, no penalty without previous law), laid out in paragraph 1 of art. 15 of the
ICCPR, is conditioned as follows in para. 2:
Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any
act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the
general principles of law recognized by the community of nations.
141

Genocide Studies and Prevention 2:2 August 2007

Although Turkey is not a state party to the above-mentioned convention, international
law is clear on the subject: there is no prescription on the prosecution of the crime of
genocide, regardless of when the genocide occurred, and the obligation of the
responsible state to make restitution or pay compensation for properties obtained by
means of genocide does not lapse with time.
In its judgment of 6 October 1983 in the case of Klaus Barbie, the
French Cour de Cassation rejected the objections of the defense and stated
that the prohibition on statutory limitations for crimes against humanity is
now part of customary international law.48 France also enacted a law on
26 December 1964 dealing with crimes against humanity as ‘‘imprescriptibles’’
by nature.49
Similarly, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has ruled that ‘‘provisions
on prescription . . . are inadmissible’’ when they ‘‘are intended to prevent the
investigation and punishment of those responsible for serious human rights violations
such as torture, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution and forced disappearance,’’ since they ‘‘violate non-derogable rights recognized by international human
rights law.’’50

Imprescriptibility of the Right to Restitution and Compensation in Cases
of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity
Because of the continuing character of the crime of genocide in factual and legal terms,
the remedy of restitution is not foreclosed by the passage of time.51 Thus the survivors
of the Istanbul pogrom, like the survivors of the massacres against the Greeks of
Pontos and Smyrna, have standing, both individually and collectively, to advance a
claim for restitution. This has also been true for the Jewish survivors of the Holocaust,
who have successfully claimed restitution against many states where their property
was destroyed or confiscated.52 Whenever possible, restitutio in integrum
(complete restitution, restoration to the previous condition) should be granted,
so as to reestablish the situation that existed before the violation occurred.
But where restitutio in integrum is not possible, compensation may be substituted
as a remedy.
Restitution remains a continuing state responsibility also because of Turkey’s
current human-rights obligations under international treaty law, particularly the
corpus of international human-rights law.
The UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Reparation for Victims of
Gross Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law provide
in part that
Reparation may be claimed individually and where appropriate collectively, by the
direct victims of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, the
immediate family, dependants or other persons or groups of persons closely connected
with the direct victims.

Particularly important are principle 9:
Statutes of limitations shall not apply in respect of periods during which no
effective remedies exist for violations of human rights or international
humanitarian law. Civil claims relating to reparations for gross violations of human
rights and international humanitarian law shall not be subject to statutes
of limitations.
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and principle 12:
Restitution shall be provided to re-establish the situation that existed prior to the
violations of human rights or international humanitarian law. Restitution requires,
inter alia, . . . return to one’s place of residence and restoration of . . . property.53

Louis Joinet, member of the UN Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities presented two reports containing comparable language:
Any human rights violation gives rise to a right to reparation on the part of the victim
or his beneficiaries, implying a duty on the part of the State to make reparation and the
possibility of seeking redress from the perpetrator.54

Although the ICC, established in July 2002, does not have jurisdiction to examine
instances of genocide that occurred prior to the entry into force of the Rome Statute, it
does reaffirm the international law obligation of providing reparation to victims.
Article 75, para 1, of the Rome Statute stipulates that ‘‘The Court shall establish
principles relating to reparations,’’ which it defines as restitution, compensation, and
rehabilitation.
This obligation under international law to make reparation for violations of rights
is reaffirmed in General Assembly Resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005. Pursuant to
art. 11 of the principles enumerated in this resolution, the remedies for gross violations
of human rights include the victim’s right to ‘‘(a) equal and effective access to justice;
(b) adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered; c) access to relevant
information concerning violations and reparation mechanisms.’’ Pursuant to art. 6,
‘‘statutes of limitations shall not apply to gross violations of international human
rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law which constitute
crimes under international law.’’55
In the context of reparation for gross violations of human rights, two other general
principles are relevant: the principle ex injuria jus non oritur (no right arises from a
wrong), that no state should be allowed to profit from its own violations of law; and the
principle of ‘‘unjust enrichment.’’56 It is a general principle of law that the criminal
cannot keep the fruits of the crime.57
In denying the applicability of statutes of limitation to restitution claims
by survivors of the Holocaust, Irwin Cotler argues,
The paradigm here is not that of restitution in a domestic civil action involving
principles of civil and property law, or restitution in an international context involving
state responsibility in matters of appropriation of property of aliens; rather, the
paradigm—if there can be such a paradigm in so abhorrent a crime—is that
of restitution for Nuremberg crimes, which is something dramatically different in
precedent and principles. . . . Nuremberg crimes are imprescribable [sic],58 for
Nuremberg law—or international laws anchored in Nuremberg Principles—does not
recognize the applicability of statutes of limitations, as set forth in the Convention on
the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity.59

The Doctrine of Non-recognition
Hersch Lauterpacht points out that the doctrine of non-recognition is based on
the principle of ex injuria jus non oritur:
This construction of non-recognition is based on the view that acts contrary
to international law are invalid and cannot become a source of legal rights
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for the wrongdoer. That view applies to international law one of ‘‘the general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations.’’ The principle ex injuria jus non oritur is one of
the fundamental maxims of jurisprudence. An illegality cannot, as a rule, become a
source of legal right to the wrongdoer.60

Similarly, the ‘‘Friendly Relations’’ resolution of the General Assembly stipulates that
‘‘No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized
as legal.’’61 In cases of ‘‘ethnic cleansing,’’ the rights of the entire international
community have been affected, and every state is obliged to refrain from giving
recognition or effect to the consequences of the crime. For instance, art. 10 of the Draft
Declaration on Population Transfer and the Implantation of Settlers concerning the
illegality of population transfers provides in part that ‘‘Where acts or omissions
prohibited in the present Declaration are committed, the international community as a
whole and individual States, are under an obligation . . . not to recognize as legal the
situation created by such acts.’’62
On 9 July 2004 the ICJ issued an advisory opinion on the legality of Israel’s
construction of a security wall, concluding that states had an obligation of
non-recognition:
Given the character and the importance of the rights and obligations involved, the
Court is of the view that all States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal
situation resulting from the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem. They are also under an obligation
not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such
construction.63

Bringing the Istanbul Pogrom before an International Tribunal
Although Turkey had ratified the European Convention on Human Rights, and was
bound by its provisions, when the Istanbul pogrom took place, the individual
complaints procedure before the European Court under art. 34 of the convention
requires that petitions be submitted within six months after the exhaustion of
domestic remedies. Bearing in mind that the events occurred fifty-two years ago,
the court would now declare the petition inadmissible ratione temporis pursuant to art.
35, para. 1, of the convention.
Interstate complaints, however, may be lodged under art. 33 of the European
Convention, and any state party to the convention could submit such an interstate
application. The friendly settlement procedure could lead to appropriate lump-sum
reimbursements to the victims and their survivors.
Turkey ratified the ICCPR in 2003 and acceded to the Optional Protocol (OP)
thereto in November 2006. By virtue of the OP, the UN Human Rights Committee
(HRC) is thus competent to examine individual complaints against Turkey. However,
Turkey has made a reservation to the OP restricting its application to facts and events
occurring prior to the entry into force of the OP for Turkey, thus excluding any
examination of the violations of the right to life (art. 6) and cruel and degrading
treatment (art. 7) accompanying the Istanbul pogrom. Turkey has also not given the
declaration, under art. 41 of the ICCPR, that would give the HRC competence to
entertain interstate complaints. Thus, the only avenue of redress would be through the
examination of Turkey’s periodic reports to the HRC under art. 40 of the ICCPR.
Although this is not a complaints procedure, the HRC would take cognizance of
the failure of the state party to give appropriate restitution and compensation to the
victims of the Istanbul pogrom.
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Pursuant to art. 34 of the Statute of the ICJ, only states may be parties in cases
before the court. Thus, individuals or groups lack standing before the ICJ. Although
the court can examine ad hoc cases submitted by states parties, it cannot do so if one of
the parties does not accept the ICJ’s competence, and Turkey has let its declaration
under art. 36(2), recognizing as compulsory ipso facto the jurisdiction of the court,
expire.
A contentious case concerning the 1948 UNCG, however, could be entertained
notwithstanding the absence of a declaration by Turkey under art. 36, para. 2, of the
statute. Indeed, pursuant to art. 36, para. 1, this would be possible, because Turkey is
a state party to the UNCG, which stipulates in article 9 that
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or
fulfillment of the present convention, including those relating to the responsibility
of a State for genocide or for any other acts enumerated in article III, shall be
submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request to any of the parties to the
dispute.

Greece has also been a party to the UNCG since 8 December 1954, that is, since before
the Istanbul pogrom took place. Accordingly, it would be possible for Greece (or for any
other state party to the UNCG) to argue before the ICJ that the Istanbul pogrom
constituted ‘‘genocide’’ within the meaning of the convention and that Turkey is
obliged to ensure appropriate compensation to the victims and their survivors.
Greece (or any state party to the UNCG) could also invoke art. 8 of the UNCG,
which provides that any contracting party may call upon the competent organs of the
United Nations to take such action as they consider appropriate for the ‘‘suppression’’
of genocide. ‘‘Suppression’’ must mean more than just retributive justice. In order to
suppress the crime, it is necessary to suppress, as far as possible, its consequences.
This entails, besides punishing the guilty, providing restitution and compensation
to the surviving generations.
Another possibility would be to have the UN General Assembly, pursuant to art. 96
of the UN Charter, refer the matter to the ICJ for an advisory opinion, as was done in
the cases relating to South Africa’s presence in Namibia in 1970 and of Israel’s security
wall in 2003.64 The ICJ could, pursuant to art. 65 of the ICJ Statute, consider the
question of whether the consistent pattern of Turkey’s anti-Greek measures
constituted ‘‘crimes against humanity’’ or ‘‘genocide,’’ and could then fix the level
of compensation and restitution required.
Admittedly, the criminal law aspects of the UNCG are of lesser relevance in the
context of the Istanbul pogrom, since most of the principal perpetrators of the
Septemvriana are no longer alive or are too old to be prosecuted. On the other hand,
the Greek properties that were destroyed, for which their owners were not sufficiently
compensated, give rise to legitimate claims against the Turkish state. In this context,
it is worth noting the important restitution of many churches and monasteries in the
former Soviet republics, including Armenia—restitution effected in the 1990s for
confiscations that had occurred some seventy years earlier, following the Bolshevik
revolution.65 Based on this precedent, compensation for the damage caused to Greek
churches and monasteries would appear to be not only morally mandated but also
implementable in practice.
A determination by the ICJ that Istanbul Program constituted a form of genocide
would facilitate the settlement of claims for restitution, including the identification of
cultural and other properties destroyed, such as churches, monasteries, and other
assets of historic and cultural significance to the Greek communities of Turkey.
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Conclusion
The Istanbul pogrom was a phase in the Ottoman/Turkish policy of eliminating Greek
communities from their 3,000-year-old homelands in Asia Minor, Thrace, the Aegean,
and Constantinople itself. Seen in the context of a centuries-old process of
discrimination, massacres, and expulsion, it can be classified as a form of genocide.66
At the same time, the Istanbul pogrom also falls within the definition of crimes against
humanity in both the Nuremberg Statute and in the Rome Statute of the ICC. Because
these crimes are not subject to statutes of limitations, Turkey still has important
international legal obligations to meet.
Turkey aspires to membership in the European Union, which is a community not
only of commercial interests but also of certain fundamental moral values.
By acknowledging its responsibility for the Istanbul pogrom, for other massacres,
and for the consistent pattern of religious intolerance,67 Turkey would make
its commitment to human rights, including the right to truth,68 more credible.
It is incompatible with this commitment to human rights that those responsible
for the Istanbul pogrom have been rehabilitated, and schools and airports named
after them. This state of affairs poses a serious challenge to the European
community.69
A modern, democratic Turkey, bound by the European Convention on Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, must still address
these issues.
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Bahçelievler Adnan Menderes Anadolu Lisesi and Aydın Adnan Menderes Anadolu Lisesi,
also bear his name.
Alfred de Zayas, The Genocide against the Armenians 1915–1923 and the Relevance of the
1948 Genocide Convention (Brussels: European Armenian Federation for Justice and
Democracy, 2005), 3. See also Egon Schwelb, ‘‘Crimes against Humanity,’’ British Yearbook
of International Law 23 (1946): 178–226, 181; Jean-Baptiste Racine, Le Ge´nocide des
Arme´niens. Origine et permanence du crime contre l’humanite´ (Paris: Dalloz-Sirey, 2006);
Reymond Kevorkian, Le Ge´nocide des Arme´niens (Paris: Éditions Odile Jacob, 2006).
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Turkish experts. Amor puts the prevailing intolerance in historical context: ‘‘In its
relations with Europe, the Ottoman Empire had to deal with the question of its nonMuslim minorities in the context of European claims to hegemony, often expressed under
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permanently, in addition to the Greeks who had been expelled. The Greeks were not
allowed to sell their houses or property or to take money from their bank accounts.’’
Whitman, The Greeks of Turkey, 9.
The Amor Report, para. 166, recommends that ‘‘The Government should take all necessary
measures, consistent with international human rights standards, to combat hatred,
intolerance and acts of violence, intimidation and coercion motivated by religious
intolerance.’’
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The awkwardness of the prevailing situation can be demonstrated by a
hypothetical example. How would the international community have reacted if the
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Heydrich, the architects of Kristallnacht? What would the reaction of the international
community have been if, instead of making moral and material reparation, the German
government had refused to render restitution and compensation to the victims and their
survivors?
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International Humanitarian Law and
Interventions—Rwanda, 1994
Elizabeth More
Macquarie University, New South Wales, Australia
International humanitarian law (IHL) applies to armed conflicts between and
within states. It focuses on constraining the parties involved in such conflict to
minimize human suffering, both of combatants and civilians, and, in so doing, is
complemented by international human-rights law (IHRL). Recent events show the
difficulties in implementing and enforcing both IHL and IHRL, and debate has
escalated on whether or not such laws provide any basis for intervention, including,
most controversially, military intervention.
This article reinforces earlier arguments that the 1994 Rwandan genocide
demonstrates a failure to uphold both IHL and IHRL in the face of genocide and
ongoing massive human-rights abuses. Certainly we can blame the United States
and the United Nations (especially its Security Council), but blame also attaches to
those states that failed in the will and commitment to resolve the tragedy by
meaningful international action using the legal justifications available. Their
indifference suggests complicity in the final tragedy—almost a million Rwandans
died, and some further three million became refugees—and points to the need to
reassess IHL and IHRL theory and practice. Positive alterations in human-rights
norms and growing challenges to traditional notions of sovereignty result in the
notion that sins of omission, such as occurred in Rwanda in 1994, are actually
worse than sins of commission. Moreover, it is timely to explore this failure again,
given the belated legal recognition of the Rwandan genocide by the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 2006 and the ongoing crisis in the Darfur
region of Sudan.

Introduction
Unfortunately, there remains a very wide discrepancy between the scale of abuses
being perpetrated in situations of internal armed conflict, and the underlying promise
of IHRL and IHL standards.1
The principle of non-intervention denies victims of tyranny and anarchy the possibility
of appealing to people other than their tormentors. It condemns them to fight unaided
or die. Rescuing others will always be onerous, but if we deny the moral duty and legal
right to do so, we deny not only the centrality of justice in political affairs, but also the
common humanity that binds us all.2

International humanitarian law (IHL) aims to protect combatants, civilians, and
victims in armed conflict situations, both between and within states. It tries to prevent
and punish breaches, and so devises specific rights and responsibilities for both states
and individuals, in its efforts to ‘‘humanize’’ war.3 In situations of war or emergency,
IHL and international human-rights law (IHRL) work together from different
perspectives to protect individuals and clearly define what is permissible.
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The distinction between these two complementary areas of law can be summarized as
follows:
Humanitarian law applies in situations of armed conflict . . . whereas human rights, or
at least some of them, protect the individual at all times, in war and peace alike.
However, some human rights treaties permit governments to derogate from certain
rights in situations of public emergency. No derogations are permitted under IHL
because it was conceived for emergency situations, namely armed conflict.
Humanitarian law aims to protect people who do not or are no longer taking part in
hostilities. The rules embodied in IHL impose duties on all parties to a conflict. Human
rights, being tailored primarily for peacetime, apply to everyone. Their principal goal is
to protect individuals from arbitrary behaviour by their own governments. Human
rights law does not deal with the conduct of hostilities.4

The two major universal instruments used are the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (UNCG), both dating to 1948.5 Yet political, economic, social, and
ideological differences can combine to militate against compliance, and state
sovereignty enhances contravention.
Over the last decade or so, we have seen the traditional practice of such laws
increasingly challenged, demonstrating the global impact of intra-state conflicts and
the difficulty of turning legal rhetoric into reality.6 One such challenge arose in
Rwanda in 1994.
Among strategies for humanitarian intervention, military coercive action to
protect those at risk remains controversial, with ongoing debates about the right to
intervene, how and when such a right should be exercised, and whose authority is to be
used. The case of Rwanda is controversial because such external military intervention
was not forthcoming to protect a sovereign state’s citizens when that state had failed in
its responsibility to protect them from avoidable catastrophe.7

Legal Foundations
IHL governs traditional humanitarianism and extends it into the political arena
through constraints on the conduct of warfare.8 The laws of war are complemented by
other legal frameworks, including those relating to crimes against humanity, genocide,
human rights, and torture.9 The Charter of the United Nations governs the use of
armed force within the international community as its major international
convention.10
While there is general agreement that international law cannot sanction or ignore
atrocities, debate centers on the need for a further legal basis for states’ intervening in
such situations. This debate includes concern about adopting a false dichotomy
between just war and just peace, with some arguing that intervention is morally but
not legally valid, and about whether ends justify means. On the one hand are
arguments that the UN Charter, particularly articles 2(4) and 2(7),11 together with
customary international law, does not provide a ‘‘right’’ of humanitarian intervention.
On the other hand is a growing tolerance for some activities regarded as humanitarian
intervention and legal arguments interpreting chapter 7 of the UN Charter as
permitting legal sanction of military intervention in the face of major human-rights
abuses.12
As well as chapter 7 and the human-rights provision of the UN Charter, human
protection through military intervention is broadly approved by the Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocols on IHL, as well as by principles of natural law
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and by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).13 These regulate
multilateral action and are the basis for the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian
intervention. Such intervention can be unilateral action based on self-defense;
multilateral action based on chapter 7 (where there are threats to international
peace and security); or Security Council–authorized action (covering political
instability).14
Conditions for interventions based on human protection under IHL/IHRL include
the following:
! Actions defined by the framework of the UNCG
! The threat or occurrence of large-scale loss of life
! Different manifestations of ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’
! Crimes against humanity and violations of the laws of war
! Situations of state collapse
! Overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes15

Particularly relevant to the situation in Rwanda is the 1948 UNCG. This convention
proscribes acts with specific intent to completely or partially destroy a national, ethnic,
racial, or religious group. The UNCG and the Security Council’s 1994 Report of the
Secretary General on Rwanda formed the mandate for the establishment of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994.16 Given that the UNCG
includes prevention and the presumed obligation to intervene, the international
community’s lack of will in the face of mounting evidence over a number of years seems
tragic.17
In any effort to turn legal rhetoric into reality, action is constrained by numerous
variables connected with perceptions of statehood and sovereignty. Moreover, there
can be a disjunction, as the Independent International Commission on Kosovo found,
between the law and the ethics of intervention: there, intervention was illegal but
legitimate.18
Humanitarian assistance, in preventing and alleviating human suffering and
providing humanitarian relief to civilians, is supposed to uphold the principles of
humanity, impartiality, and neutrality.19 Legal, moral, political, organizational, and
cultural problems abound, however, including concerns that interventions may create
their own human-rights problems.20
Defining humanitarian intervention is itself fraught with difficulties. Some21
adopt a broad definition, distinguishing between coercive and non-coercive or forcible
and non-forcible means and between the use of military force and that of civilian
humanitarian agencies. However, the classical definition focuses on stopping major
abuses of human rights through the use of international military force within a state.
Adopting the latter definition raises problems of international justice and order,
interveners’ risks relating to casualties and resources, and the potential for failure.22
Moreover, diverse approaches to intervention create confusion. Solidarist views of
the moral and legal universalism of intervention stress inalienable and globally
equitable human rights; realist views, pursued by many politicians, are based on
decisions of national interest and power/politics; and pluralist views, denying the
existence of universal basic human rights, emphasize cultural relativism and question
the effectiveness of humanitarian intervention.23
Aside from these debates, a central challenge is defining state sovereignty,
premised on the international community’s not interfering in a state’s internal armed
conflicts. Intervention is permissible through (a) chapter 7 and arts. 2(7) and 25 of the
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UN Charter, given threats to international peace and security; (b) the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights; and (c) art. 7 of the Rome Statute and the UNCG,
concerned with crimes against humanity and genocide.24

Rwanda25
There was little innocence in Rwanda—historically, those in power subjugated others,
and both the Hutu and Tutsi engaged in violence. The role of racist ideology in
contributing to the genocide is contested. Some claim that the genocide was the
responsibility of the Hutu alone, intent on exterminating the Tutsi ethnic group in a
premeditated and systematic way, while others dispute this argument.26 No one,
however, doubts that the Rwandan genocide of 100 days (April–July 1994) is one of the
major test cases for IHL and IHRL.
The roots of the tragedy lay in colonization. Indeed, it may be that the roots go back
at least as far as 1959, when massacres against the Tutsis began to take place every
few years. That year saw the first mass exodus of Tutsis out of Rwanda.
The genocide itself, however, had two phases:
! Phase 1: the civil war (1 October 1990–6 April 1994)
! Phase 2: genocide and its aftermath (6 April–15 July 1994, and 15 July–end of
1994)
In Phase 1, a UN peacekeeping force, the United Nations Assistance Mission for
Rwanda (UNAMIR I), supported a diplomatic and ostensibly democratic process of
decision making set out in the Arusha agreement.27 With the massacre as ‘‘a threat to
peace,’’ no humanitarian intervention to end genocide occurred until late June, when
the UN endorsed the French-led military Operation Turquoise. UNAMIR II was
deployed after the genocide was stopped by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in
July 1994. What was unique about this genocide was the massive involvement of
civilians in carrying out the massacres; the brutality of its processes; its multiple
targets; the killing of Hutu by Hutu for political and social reasons; and the genocidal
killing by civilian Hutu mobs of Tutsi civilians.28
The UN, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and other global agencies were
aware of the earlier instability that laid the foundations for this catastrophe. Warnings
were issued as a result of human-rights investigations (e.g., the UN report compiled by
Bacre Waly Ndiaye, special rapporteur on executions, warning of the risk of genocide
and suggesting some preventive measures29), alongside efforts at preventing the
tragedy through diplomacy and using UN peacekeeping forces.30 Even without
recourse to Rwanda’s earlier history, signs of escalating problems were clear from 1990
onwards—when the RPF entered Rwanda in 1990; in the troubled discussions leading
to the Arusha peace agreement in 1993; in the increasing racist media propaganda
(including tactics of dehumanization); in the rise of extremist Hutus; and in the
coordinated campaign of arms and hatred toward a final solution—the annihilation of
Tutsis to preserve Hutu privilege and power.31 Such problems, coupled with difficult
social, political, and economic conditions (including a famine), were the basis for mass
murder. With the 1994 plane crash that killed the presidents of both Rwanda and
Burundi, violence flared, beginning the genocide of 800,000 Rwandans, mainly Tutsi
and moderate Hutu. The massacre ended with the RPF victory in July 1994.32
The evidence is that the global community, armed with both IHL and IHRL, failed
to react adequately to the genocide.
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Key Issues Concerning IHL in the Conflict
The majority of the conditions allowing for an intervention based on human-protection
law were evident in Rwanda, especially from 1990 onwards. The humanitarian
intervention that took place in response consisted of unarmed and pacific actions in
preventative diplomacy; the Arusha process, which was unsuccessful in introducing
democracy; the armed and pacific actions with peacekeeping of UNAMIR I and II, the
United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), and Operation
Turquoise; post-genocide assistance to refugees; and the Rwandan tribunal. There
was little effective action, military or otherwise, to prevent the catastrophe, and when
action was taken, it failed. Rwanda and international humanitarian law had lost.33
There was nevertheless potential for successes in the turmoil, even though some
did not eventuate. These included some aspects of the unimplemented Arusha
agreement process and documentation that, if successfully implemented, could have
led to the end of the civil war and the establishment of a democracy; Operation
Turquoise, a humanitarian effort that did too little and came too late—successful in
saving around 15,000 lives, but failing by offering safe conduct for some génocidaires;
and the refugee camps, which succeeded in providing some respite to refugees but
which also failed by providing safe haven for many génocidaires. And success was
evident in a number of war criminals being brought to trial, through a slow process,
though unfortunately many still escaped justice.34
The Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the UN during the1994
Genocide in Rwanda cites the key problem as
a lack of resources and a lack of will to take on the commitment which would have been
necessary to prevent or to stop the genocide. UNAMIR, the main component of the
United Nations presence in Rwanda, was not planned, dimensioned, deployed or
instructed in a way which provided for a proactive and assertive role in dealing with a
peace process in serious trouble.35

Its detailing of deficiencies is harrowing and troubling, especially given the ongoing
crisis in Darfur.36
The major obstacle to developing intervention in Rwanda was that
humanitarian intervention and enforcement of the Genocide Convention became prime
moral concerns, but legal constructs and supportive machinery for the new
international order were not yet sufficiently developed. Rwanda therefore demonstrated the fateful gap between intent and results, between principles and
performance.37

Others ostensibly were38
! Increasing caution based on prior intervention history39
! Political and domestic issues, including the potential for loss of troops
! The dysfunctional bureaucracy at the UN, characterized by a lack of
coordination, bureaucratic indifference, and an inflexible mindset
! Humanitarian concerns coming second best to base institutional interests
! Lack of interest on the part of the Security Council
! The UN’s dependence on member states to supply troops for military
intervention
! Poorly trained troops
! The lack of a clear humanitarian intervention mandate capable of incremental
adjustment to meet changing needs
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! Overt international indifference (including media coverage) and inadequate
resources for intervention (e.g., supporting the residual UNAMIR troops),
which communicated poor resolve and a lack of intent to act
! An inability to handle multiple crises, with competing foreign-policy
concerns during the genocide involving China, North Korea, Croatia, Haiti, and
Angola
! The possibility of an inherently racist international humanitarian order

Moreover, US President Bill Clinton’s Policy Decision Directive 25 (3 May 1994)
advocated a very cautious approach to peacekeeping, expressing concern about
resource implications.40 This contextualized the Security Council’s caution, its
emphasis on a cease-fire with its peacekeeping force, and member states’ unwillingness to provide resources while already engaged elsewhere.41
Given IHL, IHRL, and the UNCG, the Security Council’s unanimous vote on
21 April 1994 to reduce UNAMIR forces, in the face of evidence of genocide,
is staggering! So too is its failure to respond to Kofi Annan’s letter of 29 April 1994,
which urged the UN to move from neutral mediation to ending the civilian
massacres.42
More successful was the cable sent from Rwanda on 6 May 1994 by UN Special
Representative Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh,43 reporting on the civilian massacres and
the worsening situation and asking that UNAMIR be given the resources and the
mandate to end the killings and continue efforts for a cease-fire. This cable provided a
basis for ongoing discussions by the Security Council during the month of May, leading
to establishment of UNAMIR II (17 May 1994) and an expansion of the mission’s troops
to 5,500. This was aided by a report to the Security Council (31 May 1994) that offered
further evidence of genocide, including evidence collected since January and not acted
upon. Only in late May 1994 did the Security Council act more appropriately, imposing
an arms embargo and expanding UNAMIR’s mandate to provide civilian, refugee, and
humanitarian operations security. In June it finally authorized a French operation
to protect refugees because Rwanda had become a threat to regional peace
and security.44 However, by 25 July only 550 troops had been committed, highlighting
the ongoing lack of UN member engagement.45
The final failure was that, after the genocide, the catastrophe spilled over more
broadly into the African Great Lakes crisis.46
Elsewhere, the situation was different. For example, Serbian sovereignty was
confronted by the NATO attack on Kosovo, which challenged international law by
breaching two fundamental provisions of the UN Charter (arts. 2(4) and 2(7)).
The basis of the NATO action was a moral justification on grounds of humanitarian
necessity. This action provides an opportunity for establishing customary international law, with retrospective justification for intervening against a state that had
clearly committed crimes against humanity. Cases such as Rwanda’s challenge
international law, showing the need for intervention on a humanitarian basis without
UN approval, demonstrating what can happen when Security Council politics result in
partisanship and unforgivable delay while thousands are slaughtered. In Rwanda, the
peacekeeping interventions did not mitigate suffering.47
What confronts us is the failure to act, even when action is supported by law.48
Consequently, the genocide in Rwanda serves to remind us of the difference between
human aspirations (enshrined in law, morality, and ethics) and the reality of inaction.
The international community was unwilling to intervene to save Rwandan lives, even
with its imperfect legal tools.49
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The problem of terminology also emerges, not only in the fuzziness of the UNAMIR
mandate but, particularly, in the reluctance to use the term ‘‘genocide.’’50 Given the
information provided by NGOs in 1993 and early 1994, as well as reports from the
UN’s own representatives in 1994, it is apparent that problems with politics, morality,
and imagination, rather than inadequate warnings, prevented an early response to the
unfolding genocide. Yet, clearly, genocide was evident in April, alongside killings
related to the civil war and those politically or socially motivated.51

Lessons
Genocide stands to crimes against humanity as premeditated murder stands to
intentional homicide . . . The sad reality is that, five years after the Rwandan genocide,
and despite professions of guilt about their inertia while the crimes were taking place,
States are hardly more prepared today to intervene to prevent genocide in central
Africa.52

While the UNCG imposes a moral obligation on states to prevent and punish genocide,
this does not mean—contrary to what policy makers imagined in 1994—immediate
deployment of military forces; rather, responses may include military as well as
diplomatic, juridical, and economic actions. So what is required by law, morality, and
ethics needs clarification.53
The UNCG is concerned with both preventing and punishing the crime of genocide,
and, while the two are intimately connected, in the deterrent function of law,
punishment is often the aspect most emphasized. Certainly the convention does not
cover preventative measures in relation to hate propaganda, racist organizations,
or preparatory acts potentially leading to genocide. And, indeed, there is an ongoing
debate about humanitarian intervention per se. These issues certainly were evident,
as outlined earlier, in the failure to prevent the Rwandan genocide, and especially in
the conduct of the UN and its constituent elements. President Clinton did, however,
announce the establishment of a genocide early warning center, to be directed by the
CIA and the State Department. Moreover, besides amending the UNCG so as to
enhance the duty to prevent genocide, states could commit to using force to prevent
genocide in a General Assembly resolution, and regional bodies (e.g., the OAU/African
Union) could also adopt this approach. This would authenticate and make binding law
the convention’s obligation to prevent genocide, which could be further enhanced
by extending the range of punishable acts to include, for example, the type of hate
propaganda used to such effect in Rwanda, and by requiring states to report on their
compliance with the UNCG.54
A major weakness demonstrated by the international community’s reaction to the
genocide in Rwanda is ‘‘its extreme inadequacy to respond urgently with prompt and
decisive action to humanitarian crises entwined with armed conflict.’’55 Moreover,
Rwanda showed that, even with Security Council authorization of international action
to resolve humanitarian suffering, as with UNAMIR II, there is no guarantee that
effective action will occur. Unless the right administrative processes are in place,
IHL/IHRL cannot be adequately implemented. ‘‘Rwanda in 1994 involved a failure, not
only by key member states, but in the leadership of the UN and in the effective
functioning of the Secretariat as well.’’56 It also revealed a ‘‘neutral humanitarianism,’’
with UNAMIR as ‘‘a kind of hedged bet, in which intervening parties salve their
consciences while avoiding the difficult political commitments that might actually stop
civil war.’’57 Unfortunately, IHL/IHRL’s weaknesses, rather than their strengths, were
revealed by the Rwandan tragedy.
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Simon Chesterman, in 2001, that claimed international law is devalued through
the incoherence of the Security Council’s mandate.58 Allen Buchanan agrees:
‘‘The perception is growing that the requirement of Security Council authorization
is an obstacle to the protection of basic human rights in internal conflicts.’’59
The Security Council’s performance since Rwanda confirms such opinions. Buchanan
argues that
[the intervention in] Kosovo and the ensuing debate over its justifiability have
focused attention on the deficiency of existing international law concerning
humanitarian intervention. In the aftermath . . . [there is] a widening consensus that
there is an unacceptable gap between what international law allows and what morality
requires.60

For him, this justifies illegal action as a basis for reforming international law.
This may be especially true where, as in the Rwandan conflict, political concerns
prevent appropriate intervention. Tobias Vogel writes that
The conflicts in Rwanda or Afghanistan or Sudan may be serious, but as long as no
regional power feels threatened by them, the prospects of outside intervention are
weak. This is morally indefensible and potentially subversive of the idea of general
human standards enforced by individual states under multilateral authorization, and it
clearly contravenes the legal obligation of governments in dealing with genocide.
That these provisions are not taken seriously anyway is no reason to discard them
altogether.61

Moreover, as Michael Innes warns, the future for humanitarian interventions looks
bleak unless we can repackage human-rights considerations to appeal to both doves
and hawks. Innes adds that, because states generally regard intervention as a right
rather than an obligation (under the UNCG), genocide prevention founders on cynical
policy decisions related to national interests. And in the absence of appropriate
measures of censure or penalties for failing in a duty to intervene, political agendas
and dysfunctional self-interest will prevail. Such interests are currently dominated
by US military potency, and, consequently, a pragmatic process of selective
engagement is likely to be standard.62
Recommendations from the Rwanda inquiry report63 suggest how the
United Nations can improve its response to international humanitarian crises:
! Establish a UN Action Plan to prevent genocide
! Improve its capacity in peacekeeping, including resources
! Have the political will to act in cases of genocide or gross violations of human
rights
! Improve its early warning capacity
! Introducing stronger measures to protect civilians in conflict situations
! Enhance security for UN and associated personnel
! Ensure full cooperation among officials responsible for the security of diverse
UN personnel
! Improve information flow and communication within the UN system
! Improve the information flow to the Security Council
! Increase information on human-rights issues
! Coordinate national evacuation operations with UN missions on the ground
! Examine potential suspensions of member states from the Security Council
in exceptional circumstances
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! Gain the support of the international community for rebuilding Rwandan
society following the genocide
! Acknowledge the UN’s share of responsibility in the failure to prevent or arrest
the Rwandan genocide
John Clarke reaffirms this need for change, suggesting that reform of international
humanitarian intervention focus on the norms and institutions shaping and regulating
the process.64 Unfortunately, the Carlsson report has not really been acted upon, or, at
least, most of the points listed have not been addressed. Even the position of special
adviser on the prevention of genocide (established in 2004 with the appointment of
Juan Méndez), is part time and underfunded.65

Contemporary Efforts to Improve IHL
In November 1994, the Security Council established, as part of the Hague Tribunal,
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), a court in Arusha mandated
to hear cases relating to the Rwandan genocide. This advanced international law by
providing for individual responsibility for breaching art. 3 of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, as well as punishment for genocide and crimes against humanity.
Some initial problems, including corruption, gave way to a drawn-out process, with
some prisoners still awaiting trial.66 It remains unclear to what extent such tribunals
might act to deter future genocides, for
deterrence . . . is frequently elusive. . . . Prevention requires more than just taking steps
to deter individuals from committing crimes by prosecuting offenders, however.
Effective prevention over time also requires more far-reaching initiatives. These
include . . . overcoming a legacy of impunity by strengthening the rule of law, including
the institutions and cultural attitudes that help reinforce new norms of behavior and
new patterns of accountability; and addressing grievances and inequalities that
may underlie long-standing conflicts.67

Moreover, ‘‘trials are not a panacea. They must be integrated into a broader program of
social reconstruction.’’68
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) admits that ‘‘international
humanitarian law cannot serve as a basis for armed intervention in response to grave
violations of its provisions: the use of force is governed by the United Nations Charter.’’
Nevertheless, the ICRC promotes using the term ‘‘armed intervention in response to
grave violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law,’’ fully
recognizing the controversy surrounding such intervention, whether by states,
international organizations, or NGOs and understanding that, by growing customary
law, the category of threats to peace can include intrastate violations of IHL/IHRL.69
The UN Charter is static in terms of its normative framework but is supposed
to evolve through application to practical situations. As such, it and broader
international law provide a basis for slowly bridging the gap between notions
of justice and morality and what is strictly legal.70
Clarke also emphasizes change, suggesting that escalation in intrastate conflicts
has created a new interventionist agenda, broader than traditional peacekeeping and
incorporating multiple actors working interdependently. Accompanying this phenomenon are altered international norms, especially reinterpreting state sovereignty and
making the legal threshold for action under chapter 7 much lower. Certainly, we are
now better able to recognize that military humanitarian intervention must be part
of a larger, overarching conflict agenda, involving not only early-warning and
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conflict-prevention processes but also post-conflict activities of development and
reconstruction.71
In their report on intervention and sovereignty for Canada’s International
Development Research Centre, Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun emphasize a
responsibility to protect rather than a right to intervene, arguing that we must have
standards for intervening for human protection that are consistent, credible, and
enforceable. The authors provide a useful summary of core principles for protection
and military intervention, finding growing acceptance that
the responsibility to protect its people from killing and other grave harm [is] the most
basic and fundamental of all the responsibilities that sovereignty imposes—and that if a
state cannot or will not protect its people from such harm, then coercive intervention for
human protection purposes, including ultimately military intervention, by others in
the international community may be warranted in extreme cases.72

It is not clear how much attention the UN has paid to this advice.
K. Mills suggests that, given the failure to act and to act rapidly, some sort of
standing rapid-action troop force might be a solution, or that it might be useful to have
the option of regional collective action instead of UN action. If a sovereign government
failed its people by, for example, committing gross violations of human rights, then it
could be declared illegitimate and appropriate global action taken. Mills stresses that
humanitarian intervention ought be regarded as police work and proposes that law
enforcement, supported by specialist tribunals and the ICC, might deter breaches
of IHL/IHRL.73
In 2004, the UN secretary-general proposed that the new post of special rapporteur
be established, with the mandate to warn the Security Council of potential genocides
and trigger appropriate UN interventions.74 As mentioned above, this position has
been occupied by Juan Méndez since 2004, and much recent attention has been focused
on Darfur. Méndez issued a special report in 2005 and continues to endorse
the Genocide Intervention Network.75
More recently, the secretary-general urged UN members to accept major reforms,
including enlarging the Security Council and implementing new guidelines for
authorizing military action. This was a timely effort, as US Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice had recently warned that the UN would not survive unless it
embraced desperately needed reform.76
In addition, recent debates over intervention have affected attitudes towards
future situations such as those in Rwanda and Kosovo and enabled legitimate
diplomatic discussion of intervention to protect victims of atrocities.77 A midpoint
between rigid adherence to the text of the UN Charter and efforts to define criteria
for a doctrine or right of humanitarian intervention seems to offer a way ahead.
Nevertheless, the issue of adequate resources remains a vexing problem.78
Burleigh Wilkins argues for changing domestic and international law in subtle
ways to deal with situations requiring humanitarian intervention to protect basic
human rights.79 Indeed, the 2004 UN report A More Secure World states that while the
Security Council can act preventively, this has rarely occurred and calls for a much
more proactive approach in taking early decisive action. It also emphasizes that the
UN Charter needs more clarity on intervening to stop mass atrocity; on protecting, not
just reaffirming, fundamental human rights; and, especially, on implementing
the UNCG. The report endorses
the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect,
exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort,
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in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious
violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have
proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.80

Others urge better research, from diverse perspectives, into the crimes of international
humanitarian law, better understanding and preventing IHL/IHRL violations, and
early-warning indicators.81

Conclusion
International refusal to recognize the genocide was wrong, both morally and legally.82

In spite of the record of increasing military humanitarian intervention over the last
decade, the global community has not realized the principle of humanitarian equity in
policy or action.83 Rwanda is a clear example of this, and we seem to have learned
little, given the current genocide occurring in Darfur, which seems to confirm the
possibility of racism in intervention.84 It seems to repeat the international
community’s apathy over the Rwandan disaster, although the United States has
already declared the crisis a genocide.85 The UNCG explains how the international
community ought to react, but adequate concern, action, and aid are again not
forthcoming: again the international community is complicit in atrocities.86
In 1999, Kofi Annan, then secretary-general of the United Nations, acknowledged
the failure to prevent or halt the Rwandan genocide in 1994, claiming that ‘‘of all my
aims as Secretary-General, there is none to which I feel more deeply committed than
that of enabling the United Nations never again to fail in protecting a civilian
population from genocide or mass slaughter.’’87 The crisis in Darfur reveals how little
we seemed to have learned from the Rwandan genocide about using IHL/IHRL
effectively in humanitarian intervention. Peter Beinart claims that ‘‘in hindsight,
stopping genocide is easy. But in Darfur, where it is happening now, stopping genocide
is brutally hard . . . Diplomacy hasn’t stopped the genocide. It’s time to give war a
chance.’’88
Or, as Christopher Taylor writes,
we need to understand human malevolence in all of its ramifications, for it seems that
otherwise we are doomed, as happened in Rwanda, to let history repeat itself. Consider
the historical context of the 1948 Geneva Convention: the self-congratulatory
triumphalism, the assurance that evil had been defeated, the bold pronouncements
against genocide. All that came to naught in Rwanda. . . . Rwanda was simply too little,
too far away, too poor, and too black for the ‘‘developed’’ world to care about.89

Finally, our responsibility to rebuild after intervention has still to be recognized.90
The criminal courts persevere with their work, more than a decade after the
genocide;91 but, as Des Forges and Longman write,
Although stopping impunity and building the rule of law remain essential for Rwandan
society to unity and avoid future violence, it remains unclear whether prosecutions as
they are now being carried out will contribute to this process, or how they will do so.92

May enhances this viewpoint in his discussion of the real complexities of the
international prosecution of genocide and the violation of State sovereignty.93
Nevertheless, we continue to look for the best ways to prevent mass atrocity, and to
deal with it when it occurs.94 Yet the roots of conflict grow in the ongoing separation of
Hutu and Tutsi, in government by a minority, and in the economic and social problems
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that remain. This does not augur well for a peaceful future. Will our laws and our
commitment be ready for the next crisis?
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When on 12 October 2006 the French National Assembly approved a bill that made it a
crime to deny the mass killings of Armenians in Turkey around the turn of the
twentieth century, Turkish leaders lamented the decision as a great disappointment,
while several European officials insisted that it was not for the law to write history.
That task, however, is compromised when leading historians deny, in Jacques Chirac’s
memorable words, a country’s ‘‘dramas and errors.’’1 Because experts are lured to
power, sometimes at the expense of their integrity, it behooves those searching for the
truth to redouble their efforts. Therefore, the genuine need to identify and correct
assertions made by those who wish to deny historical facts is a duty both to history and
to the truth itself. Guenter Lewy, an emeritus professor of political science at the
University of Massachusetts—Amherst, is the latest researcher attempting to deny
the Armenian Genocide.2
Indeed, the inordinate nature of Lewy’s resort to political leverage is such as to
render the need for a critical review of this agenda-laden tome even more pressing.
As Lewy has declared that ‘‘a book [must] be judged by its content and not by the
motive of its author,’’3 this review will attempt such an endeavor. Lewy opines that
‘‘most Armenians . . . do not know Turkish’’ (xi); according to him, therefore, few
Armenians may be competent to write on the topic of the Armenian Genocide or to offer
critiques of books on the subject. In fact, however, not only do many Armenians
know Turkish, some are fluent in the language—including this reviewer.4

The Relocation Assertion
Lewy systematic uses and emphasizes the term ‘‘relocation’’ throughout his book; this
prejudicial stance is striking, and the theme of relocation truly dominates the text.
According to Lewy, Turkish authorities had no intention of liquidating the Armenian
population but were merely trying to deport and resettle that population; their
blunders and failures in the process caused massive but unintended casualties.
To foster this perspective, Lewy relies on several techniques, including pronounced
selectivity of data, deflection, distortion, and occasional falsification.
We are told, for example, that the American Associated Press correspondent
George Abel Schreiner explained the fate of the Armenians as merely the result of
‘‘Turkish ineptness, more than intentional brutality’’ (qtd. 254); Schreiner asks us to
believe that it was mere clumsiness that ‘‘was responsible for the hardships the
Armenians were subjected to’’ (qtd. 254).5 In a widely read volume published in 1918,
however, and based on diary entries written immediately after particular events,
Schreiner writes, ‘‘the Armenians are going through hell again . . . [because] the
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deportations . . . [presented a] shocking phase of barbarity . . . .’’6 Schreiner, who had
interviewed both Mehmet Talât Pasha and Ismail Enver Pasha, the two principal
architects of the Armenian Genocide, preserved his unedited diaries. Of course, in
writing ‘‘again,’’ his point of reference is actually the 1909 Adana massacres, which
formed the prelude to the 1915 genocide. Schreiner’s rich text, based on first-hand
observations, since he maintained that he personally witnessed horrible acts that he
denounced as ‘‘repulsive, loathsome, [that] must cause us to consider whether or not
the Turk has a right to rule others.’’ He perceptively asks whether ‘‘a Government that
tolerates this [may be] so low, contemptible, a thing that nothing whatever can be said
in its favor.’’7
Lewy further quotes Dr. Leopold Gustav Alexander von Hoesch, who compiled
German ambassador Wolff-Metternich’s seventy-two-page report of 18 September
1916, which dealt with the Armenian deportations and massacres, as follows:
‘‘The authorities . . . had been unprepared for the deportations and therefore had
failed to provide food and protection for the exiles’’ (254). Lewy implies that
Constantinople did not approve of any hardships and that victims paid the price of
disorder. Yet, in the same report, the German expert categorically declares that there
was no Armenian ‘‘general uprising.’’8 Apart from that in Van, Von Hoesch
characterized the three other uprisings as acts of self-defense in the face of imminent
mass deportations.9 What is even more significant is that the German expert granted
the reasonableness of this right of self-defense.10 Remarkably, his report reveals that,
long before the Turkish defeat of Sarikamis and the Van uprisings, anti-Armenian acts
were occurring in Erzurum in December 1914.11
The selective quotation continues with a statement attributed to Dr. Mustafa
Res" id, the governor of Diyarbekir province and one of the most wanton organizers of
the Armenian Genocide, as saying that ‘‘the disorganization of the State authorities
was so pronounced that an orderly deportation became impossible’’ (254). Yet,
on several occasions, this same governor not only conceded his role in having tens of
thousands of Armenians massacred in his province but openly bragged about it. Res" id’s
deranged rationale was that Armenians were ‘‘microbes infesting’’ the fatherland
(musallat mikrob) and that he, as a physician, found it necessary to ‘‘eradicate sick
people.’’12
Lewy’s text is peppered with such gems. For example, when he discusses the April
1915 Armenian uprising in Van, Lewy writes that ‘‘the Armenians of Van . . . went on
the offensive’’ (96). This kernel is based on the statements of Major Rafael de Nogales,
a Venezuelan soldier of fortune who volunteered his services to the Turkish military.
Yet, in his massive tome, de Nogales actually writes,
The Armenians had attacked the town [Van]. Immediately I mounted my horse . . . went
to see what was happening. Judge of my amazement to discover that the aggressors had
not been the Armenians after all, but the civil authorities themselves . . . Supported by
the Kurds and the rabble of the vicinity, they were attacking and sacking the Armenian
quarter.13

Obviously, these are serious discrepancies that cannot easily be dismissed.
This particular episode was well documented by none other that Ibrahim Arvas, the
former governor general of Van. In his memoirs, Arvas admits that the authorities,
while denouncing Armenians, ‘‘underhandedly were inciting the people against the
[same] Armenians, only to annihilate [itlaf] them at the end.’’14
To further buttress his content that the Turkish intention was to relocate the
Armenians, Lewy expresses doubts about the reality of the drowning operations in
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the Black Sea through which a significant portion of the Armenian population
of Trabzon province perished (181–82). It might be useful, once again, to refer to a
Turkish parliamentarian representing that province, who stunned his colleagues with
an inordinate disclosure. In fact, Hafez Mehmet, a lawyer by profession, testified and
proclaimed to the Chamber of Deputies immediately after the war that he had
personally witnessed drowning operations, in the port city of Ordu on the Black Sea,
whereby Armenian children and women were loaded unto large barges and taken out
to sea to be drowned.15 This particular question was addressed by the Turkish general
Mehmet Vehip Pasha, wartime commander-in-chief of the Third Army, who further
testified that ‘‘thousands of Armenians were also burned alive in haylofts.’’16

From Relocation to Distortion
Continuing, Lewy again cites ‘‘relocation’’ (155) and the problems associated with it,
such as transportation, as the source of the peril of hundreds of thousands of
Armenians. What we must accept is the incredible twist of misdirection ignoring the
key problem, namely the ultimate destination of the deportees: the desolate and barren
deserts of Mesopotamia. None other than the Turkish general Ali Fuad Erden, chief of
staff of Cemal Pasha’s Fourth Army, headquartered in that very same region, concedes
the lethal purpose of this governmental measure: ‘‘There was neither preparation nor
organization to shelter the hundreds of thousands of the deportees.’’17 Ahmed Refik
Altinay, another contemporary Turkish authority who has referred to these masses of
Armenian deportees as being ‘‘driven to blazing deserts, to hunger, misery and death,’’
holds a similar view.18 Following extensive research, Taner Akçam states that
nowhere at their destination in the deserts ‘‘were there any requisite arrangements’’
for resettling or relocating the remnants of the Armenian deportees; this fact alone ‘‘is
sufficient proof of the existence of this plan of annihilation.’’19 This fact was so well
known that, on 16 July 1915, Hans Freiherr von Wangenheim, the Turkophile German
ambassador to Turkey, felt constrained to warn Berlin that the Turkish ally was
‘‘bent on destroying the Armenians by relocating them in barren regions.’’ For dubious
reasons, Lewy ignores this important declaration as well.20
In fact, in his drive to question anything that substantiates the genocidal nature of
the Armenian experience, Lewy ventures into the domain of legal squabbles to buttress
his argumentation, even if he ends up more confused. He repeatedly invokes the
procedures of the Nuremberg Tribunal (72, 80), especially with respect to documentary
evidence, precisely to dismiss the findings of the post-war Turkish Military Tribunal as
devoid of any value. For Lewy, Nuremberg is preferred as a criterion to invalidate
Istanbul, especially with respect to the production and attestation of documents.
One can easily identify a few misconceptions at work in this rationalization. First, the
Nuremberg Tribunal was not only an international body but an instrument of military
occupation; it therefore operated on standards at variance with those of the Turkish
Military Tribunal in Istanbul. Second, the concept of ‘‘due process,’’ as generally
understood, was deliberately circumvented at Nuremberg, notwithstanding Lewy’s
assertions to the contrary. Indeed, article 19 of the Nuremberg Charter stipulated that
the Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. [Rather,] it shall adopt
and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and non-technical procedure and
shall admit any evidence which it deems to have probative value.21

Remarkably, although the Turkish Military Tribunal was a national rather than an
international body, and although it operated as a national military court under the
provisions of martial law, it embodied the very same stipulations contained in the
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above-cited art. 19 of the Nuremberg Charter. Moreover, in legal terminology,
‘‘probative’’ evidence is that which has the effect of proof, tends to prove, or actually
proves, and is hence theoretically capable of producing conviction of, the main thing—
namely, truth. Even though this was not required, the sessions of the Turkish court
martial were conducted publicly, and defense counsel were allowed to present their
cases, as is amply documented by the opening statements made during the first session
of the major trials. Several defense lawyers, led by Celaleddin Arif, president of the
Turkish Bar Association, took more than an hour to present their cases.22
Lewy further ignores a basic fact when he contrasts and deprecates the Turkish
court martial with ‘‘Western standards of due process’’ (79). Perhaps he excludes
France from the West; the fact is that Ottoman penal codes and the Ottoman Code of
Criminal Procedures are almost entirely modeled after their French counterparts.23
Consequently, there is no room for ‘‘cross-examination,’’ since French criminal law
does not call for it. Furthermore, the state of siege then obtaining in Istanbul precluded
recourse to standard rights and guarantees. As art. 2 of the Annex to the Temporary
Law on the State of Siege provides, ‘‘While the State of Siege remains in force,
Constitutional Laws and other Laws, and administrative rules are temporarily
suspended.’’ Article 3, on the other hand, provides that ‘‘the functions of Cabinet
Council [shall] transfer to military authorities.’’24
Perhaps the most outlandish and patently pro-Turkish partisan claim in the entire
book is Lewy’s declaration that ‘‘no authentic documentary evidence exists to prove the
culpability of the central government of Turkey for the massacres of 1915–16’’ (250).
In other words, the systematic and brutal dislocation and deportation of hundreds of
thousands of the victim population culminated by sheer accident in the violent
extirpation of the bulk of that population. Readers are asked to believe that the central
government, which had acquired overwhelming authority and power, miraculously
became so helpless as to lose control over the arrangements of the deportation
processes because of the exigencies of war. This is akin to believing that the Nazi
government in Berlin had similarly lost control over the network of administrative
personnel in charge of several concentration camps, thereby inadvertently allowing
the systematic extermination of the millions of victims involved! Furthermore,
Lewy asserts that since no ‘‘authentic documents’’ showing explicit orders for
extermination are at hand, the victims must have perished for some other reason!
As Hikmet Yusuf Bayur, the late dean of Turkish historians, maintained, ‘‘the most
important cabinet decisions were secretly made by two or three people, [so] it is only
natural that they will not show up in the transcripts of the Cabinet Council.’’25 Lewy
conveniently ignores the fact that unlike the Nazis, who were obsessed with recordkeeping, the Young Turk perpetrators avoided keeping such records, as well as the fact
that, shortly before their collective escape to Germany on 1–2 November 1918, they
destroyed as many of the surviving documents as they could. In any event, a
clarification that is sorely missing from Lewy’s tome may provide the linkage to the
next item to be discussed: the fact that the so-called central government of Turkey was
one and the same entity as the Central Committee of the Young Turk movement,
the Ittihat ve Terakki Partisi, or Committee of Union and Progress (CUP).

The Gargantuan Mystery of the CUP
The failure to identify the CUP’s Central Committee as the supreme executive
authority and the affiliated Tekilat-ı Mahsusa, or Special Organization (SO), as its
lethal anti-Armenian instrument is truly mind-boggling. In fact, the linkage
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was authoritatively established by Mehmet Vehip, commander-in-chief of the Turkish
Third Army, whose command zone encompassed the seven eastern and central
provinces and, thus, the bulk of the Armenian population of Turkey. In his famous
5 December 1918 testimony, prepared upon the request of the Turkish Military
Tribunal, Vehip clearly stated that governmental authorities (rüesayi hükümet)
meekly and obediently submitted to the dictates of the CUP’s Central Committee in
the matter of ‘‘Armenian deportations and massacres [tehcir ve taktil].’’ Moving one
step further, this vaunted Turkish officer bluntly confirmed the fact that CUP-directed
operations of mass murder were carried out according to ‘‘a resolute plan [mukarer bir
plan],’’ as well as with ‘‘definite prior deliberation [mutlak bir kasd tahtinda]’’—in
other words, with premeditation.26 Moreover, General Vehip exposed for the first time
the role of the numerous convicts who were organized and enlisted by SO chief
Dr. Bahaeddin S" akir; he described them as ‘‘gallows birds’’ and ‘‘butchers of human
beings [insan kasaplari].’’
This last point, one of the foremost features of the Armenian Genocide, is often
overlooked but must not be. At the implementation level of the deportations,
thousands of convicts were employed to carry out the merciless and wanton massacres,
which engendered further hatred against the crime of organized mass murder.
By denying this paramount fact, Lewy is either exhibiting total ignorance or indulging
in unscrupulous distortion, if not falsification. The statement ‘‘there is no evidence
anywhere that this or any other S.O. detachment was diverted to duty involving the
Armenian deportations’’ (85) summarizes his position. Such a view is questionable and,
in fact, fully rejected by a series of Turkish testimonies involving both primary and
secondary sources. To plunge into this kind of research without a command of
the Turkish language, relying on others whose identities are not divulged, is full
of liabilities and risks, even inviting suspicions of intent and an agenda. What follows,
by way of rebuttal of several specific falsifications, may convince Lewy and his
supporters of these risks and avoid further confusion and obfuscation.
In his critical monograph Belgelerle Teskiläti Mahsusa, Ergun Hiçyilmaz declares
that the SO was created to curb the domestic separatist movements that were
imperiling the Ottoman Empire.27 Likewise, Suat Parlar, in Osmanlıdan Günümüze
Gizli Devlet, confirms that ‘‘the SO was an Islamist and Turkist outfit that played an
important role in unleashing terror against the Armenians and in liquidating the
opposition.’’28 Ihsan Bı̈rinci, an expert on the SO, describes it as an outfit pursuing two
principal goals, one of which was to safeguard ‘‘the Turkish race’’ through ‘‘the
deportation of the Armenians.’’29 For his part, Ahmet Refik Altinay, a professor at
Istanbul University and a wartime official who dealt with Armenian deportations at
Eskis" ehir, wrote that ‘‘the brigands of the SO committed the worst atrocities against
the Armenians.’’30 In addition to these corroborating statements, Galib Vardar, an
actual SO chief in charge of logistics and organization, conceded that the SO was
created to deal with ‘‘external as well as internal’’ problems.31 Another eminent
Turkish political scientist, Tarik Zafer Tunaya, declares that the SO was composed in
part of ‘‘convicts’’ and that Interior Minister Talât, chief organizer of the Armenian
Genocide, was a partner in its creation and in formulating its missions.32 Sevket
Süreyya Aydemir, the author of multiple volumes on the CUP and on CUP leader
Enver Pasha, identifies the SO as a ‘‘secret and irresponsible’’ organization that was
‘‘involved in the Armenian deportations.’’33 Celal Bayar, a Turkish statesman and
longtime president of the Turkish Republic, quoting SO leader Esref Kusçubasi, wrote
that one of the SO’s functions was ‘‘the liquidation [tasfiye] of non-Turkish population
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blocs in Turkey.’’34 A final item on this brief list might refer to the verdict of a
Turkish author, Doğan Avcıoğlu, known to have had access to some of the innermost
secrets of the CUP. In the third massive volume of his series on Turkish history, he
reveals that the Central Committee of the CUP and Enver Pasha held a series of secret
meetings at which it was decided to ‘‘liquidate’’ (tasfiye) the ‘‘Christian elements,’’ for
which purpose young and trusted staff officers were invited to Istanbul to map out the
requisite plans.35 Without mincing words, Avcıoğlu declares that ‘‘the ultimate goal of
the Armenian deportations was to radically solve [temelinde çözme] the Armenian
Question through the engagement of the SO. It was Dr. Bahaeddin S" akir who pushed
this plan, championing it at the CUP’s CC councils.’’36

Conclusion
What is so extraordinary about this initiative is the significant campaign by Turkish
authorities to promote Lewy’s book by mobilizing their manifold resources, including
worldwide diplomatic posts. Universities, public libraries, the media, and even political
leaders are being targeted. Furthermore, Lewy has been and continues to be exalted in
Ankara, where he has been invited and showered with special honors as a star. For an
author who seems so firmly committed to joining his Turkish supporters in denying the
genocidal fate of the Armenians, there will always be scope to raise questions about
‘‘convincing’’ and irrefutable ‘‘evidence’’ (e.g., 80–82, 87, 88), thereby casting doubt on
the full measure of the utmost secrecy of the CUP’s genocidal scheme and the details of
its execution. Rhetoric, in all its grim shallowness, is pitted here against the
overwhelming physical evidence of a crime of vast proportions. This shallowness is
even more acutely evident in the list of countless factual errors that further degrades
the volume under review.37
In an essay dealing with the issue of partisan scholarship, the late Terrence des
Pres deplores the subservience of a growing number of academics to the lures and
rewards of ‘‘power’’ at the expense of ‘‘the integrity of knowledge.’’ He wonders whether
the deliberate misuse of the maxim ‘‘there are two sides to every issue’’ has not reduced
it to a ‘‘gimmick’’ to undermine and distort rather than to ‘‘foster truth.’’ He goes on
to write,
We are now told no [Armenian] genocide took place but only a vague unfortunate
mishap determined by imponderables like time and change, the hazards of war,
uncertain demographics. There is a commonsense sound to the Turkish
proposal . . . [However,] Turkey’s denial of the Armenian disaster is backed by
something larger than mere doubt . . . .38

In a subsequent essay, Des Pres scorns the ‘‘increasing attempts to suborn the
academy . . . The issue, then, is whether or not we wish to be menials, for at the very
least scholars who spend their resources defending the honor of nation-states
serve something other than truth.’’39
What kind of scholarship should we expect from our historians when a mountain of
evidence, first-hand reports, and documented testimonials presents undeniable facts?
In Yerevan on 1 October 2006, Jacques Chirac declared, ‘‘By recognizing the genocide
of Jews, Germany did not lose its greatness and self-confidence. On the contrary, a
country and nation develops by admitting the mistakes made in the past.’’40 Denying
the Armenian Genocide when so much evidence exists is both counterproductive and,
ultimately, cowardly. Guenter Lewy may dispute it, but he has failed, in this volume,
to make his case. His failure is largely due to his goal-oriented selectivity, which,
ultimately, raises a far more important question: Can Turkey aspire to democracy
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when members of its elite and their acolytes fail to face the errors and crimes of
their past?
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The genocide of indigenous peoples throughout the Americas represents one of the
greatest and most extensive human catastrophes in history. The pace and magnitude
of the destruction varied from region to region over the years, but it can safely be
concluded that, in the two-and-a-half centuries following Christopher Columbus’
‘‘discovery’’ of the Americas in 1492, probably 95% of the pre-Columbian population
was wiped out—by disease as well as by deliberate policy on the part of the Spanish,
the French, the English, and, ultimately, the American-born heirs of those colonizing
nations.
The process of colonization was often characterized by violent confrontation,
deliberate massacre, wholesale annihilation, and, in several instances, genocide. Many
indigenous peoples in North America, for instance, were completely, or almost
completely, wiped out, including the Yuki of California and the Beothuk of
Newfoundland. It is important, therefore, that care be taken when employing the
term ‘‘genocide’’ in the context of colonial expansion: each and every claim must be
assessed individually and on its merits. In some instances, genocide might be
unequivocal; elsewhere, despite a sudden or enormous population collapse, the crucial
ingredient of the colonizers’ intent would not appear to have been present. Often,
populations declined as a result of diseases that arrived with the colonizers, and the
deaths that occurred were not anticipated. On other occasions, lethal diseases were
deliberately introduced for the purpose of wiping out a population. If we were to
generalize—not an easy task over several centuries—it could be said that colonial
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expansion in North America saw attempts at clearing the land of indigenous
populations; of forcibly assimilating these populations for racial, religious, or ethnic
reasons; and of intimidating them so that they would seek to retreat before the
advance of the colonizers, enabling Western-style economic development to take place.
Overall, we are looking at a horrific case (or, rather, series of cases) of mass human
destruction, in which millions of people lost their lives. And the destruction did not
stop once most of the people had died or been killed; in the United States, policies of
population removal, dispossession of lands, forced assimilation, and confinement to
‘‘reservations’’ meant that, in a vast number of cases, even the survivors were denied
the opportunity to retain their identity as distinct peoples.
The foundations of indigenous destruction were many, and they varied from place
to place. The quest for land, religious conversion, the development of concepts of racial
inferiority and superiority, displacement, and population transfer undertaken in the
pursuit of ‘‘progress’’ on the frontiers of European or American settlement—all of these
had their place in the devastation of the Native Americans. Individual murders,
occasional massacres, and wholesale annihilation in long-term campaigns facilitated
violent destruction. That genocide of specific Native American groups took place is
beyond doubt; but this must be tempered by the qualification that not all destruction or
population collapse occurred as the result of a deliberate intent on the part of the
settlers. On those occasions where intent can be detected, a case for genocide
might be prosecuted, but the disintegration of the Native American world was not
a monolithic event, and it must, therefore, be examined carefully and thoroughly,
with an eye to the particularity of each people, region, and period and without
preconceived opinions.
The forced removal of the Native American peoples of the southeastern United
States presents us with one such dilemma. Can this be considered a case of genocide?
In 1830, US President Andrew Jackson signed the Indian Removal Act, a law ordering
the compulsory relocation of Native American peoples living east of the Mississippi
River to a designated territory to the west. These peoples, known as the ‘‘Five Civilized
Tribes,’’ were the Cherokee, Choctaw, Creek, Chickasaw, and Seminole Nations; they
had adapted to European ways and taken the elements most suited to improving their
quality of life while at the same time retaining their sovereign integrity and folkways.
After the passage of the Indian Removal Act, however, they were forced to cede their
lands to the United States and move to other territories many hundreds of miles away.
Of the individual treaties signed following the Indian Removal Act, the first was
between the United States and the Choctaw Nation, at Dancing Rabbit Creek in 1830.
Between 1831 and 1834, most members of this nation were forced westward at the
point of federal bayonets, and in appalling conditions; because federal expenditures for
removal were inadequate, there were food shortages, unsatisfactory means of
transportation, and little in the way of warm clothing or blankets. At least a quarter
of the Choctaw Nation died before they reached the new Indian Territory in modernday Oklahoma.
A similar fate befell the other nations. In the case of the Creeks, a conflict
resembling civil war broke out between supporters and opponents of removal. When
the Creeks were ultimately ‘‘removed,’’ just under a quarter of their population died of
exposure and disease. Because of their closer proximity to the new Indian Territory,
the Chickasaws suffered less on their actual journey, but they perished in large
numbers after their arrival owing to disease. For as long as they were able, the
Seminoles managed to resist removal, and during the Seminole Wars (1835–1842) they
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made US troops pay a heavy price for their invasion of the Seminole Nation.
Nonetheless, several thousand were eventually transferred to the Indian Territory.
The Cherokees, the most numerous of the Five Civilized Tribes, did all they could
to avoid deportation, arguing their case in the highest US tribunals, including the
Senate and the Supreme Court, but by the Treaty of New Echota (signed on
29 December 1835), which ceded all Cherokee territory to the United States and
prepared the grounds for removal, they too were forced to leave by 1839.
Approximately one-quarter of the Cherokees perished between 1838 and 1839 along
what became known as the ‘‘Trail of Tears.’’ The term now stands as a generic name for
the forced removal and suffering of the Five Civilized Tribes, during which time tens of
thousands of people died as a direct result of US government actions and failures to
act.
In Voices from the Trail of Tears, Vicki Rozema, who has previously written on the
history of the Cherokees, has compiled a source book that recounts the fate of those
who undertook or observed the Cherokee Trail of Tears. In this book, the actual
participants give us an insight into what happened during this infamous chapter in
American history. Combining eyewitness accounts, letters from white missionaries
and doctors describing the mistreatment of Cherokees at the hands of the federal
troops and government officials, observations by federal soldiers, and other original
sources, Rozema’s work highlights the horror of the forced deportations for the
participants and the shock of those who witnessed them.
Rozema presents her sources in chronological, rather than thematic, order, which
shows clearly how the drama of the removals unfolded. Readers are thus exposed to a
number of key areas pertaining to the period, one of the most important of which
concerned dissent and hostility among Cherokees over the Treaty of New Echota and,
indeed, the very issue of whether or not they would allow the Cherokee Nation, as a
sovereign state, to be summarily removed by the United States government. The book
then shows the removal policy in practice, with original accounts of how the Cherokee
living in states such as Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, and Tennessee were
rounded up and sent on their way at the point of federal US bayonets. Finally,
Rozema’s documents illustrate that destruction can continue to take place long after
the most dramatic events have ended, as readers are shown how difficult it was for
those who survived the Trail of Tears to accept living in the new, alien territory of
Oklahoma—a place occupied by other Native Americans who often had a very different
perspective on the removals and those who managed to endure them.
The term ‘‘genocidal massacre’’ was introduced by noted political scientist and
genocide scholar Leo Kuper in his seminal work on genocide in the twentieth century.1
Noting that the annihilation of a section of a group in a localized massacre (e.g., of a
whole village of men, women, and children) contains some of the elements of a
genocide, Kuper sought to find a way to give such massacres their proper place within
a model of genocide while recognizing that such events do not, by themselves,
constitute genocide. He thus found the notion of genocidal massacre particularly useful
in describing colonial situations, identifying a clear affinity between colonialism and
genocide. While even an aggregation of genocidal massacres does not necessarily
indicate a policy of genocide, nonetheless the motives underlying such massacres were,
in their circumstances of time and place, motivated by a genocidal intent. For Kuper,
therefore, the genocidal massacre, while not equated with genocide, was a convenient
device for explaining the many examples of destruction that took place during the
process of territorial acquisition.
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One such genocidal massacre took place against the Cheyenne and Arapaho
peoples of Colorado on 29 November, 1864 when the Third Colorado Volunteer Cavalry
Regiment, under the command of Colonel John Chivington, led an attack against a
Cheyenne village at Sand Creek. The Third Colorado Volunteers had signed on as
Indian fighters, and over the previous two months, acting on Chivington’s orders, they
had rounded up small groups of Cheyenne and Arapaho for the purpose of killing them
at a time to be determined later. Surrounding the Indian camp at Sand Creek before
dawn on the morning of 29 November, the Third Colorado’s assault group, comprising
some 700 men and four howitzers, took their intended targets by complete surprise.
Cheyenne Chief Black Kettle pleaded with his people to keep calm and hoisted both an
American flag and a white flag of truce above his quarters, but to no avail. As the
Cheyenne realized what was happening, the US troops opened fire; the ensuing
massacre was so horrific that some of Chivington’s own men would later give evidence
against him for allowing such abhorrent acts to take place.
The soldiers were indiscriminate in their killing: men and women were scalped,
pregnant women were ripped open, children were clubbed to death, and bodies were
mutilated. No prisoners were taken, as this was intended to be a total annihilation.
Any who did surrender were killed immediately, and the massacre continued for five
miles beyond the Sand Creek campsite. When Chivington and the Third Colorado
returned to Denver, they exhibited more than a hundred scalps, the gruesome booty of
a death toll that may have numbered up to 200—of whom two-thirds were women and
children, and nine were chiefs.
The massacre at Sand Creek was committed by perpetrators whose actions were
not only explicit but eagerly advertised, with malice before the event and triumph after
it. Moreover, it was committed by a military force raised by the government of the
Colorado Territory for the express purpose of killing every Cheyenne on whom it could
lay its hands. Chivington’s orders came from the governor of Colorado, John Evans,
and these orders were endorsed by a popular clamor throughout the territory. Sand
Creek was clearly a genocidal massacre undertaken as part of a larger campaign of
genocide against the Cheyenne and Arapaho, whose objective was that none would
remain alive. It was, in its purest form, an act committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national (or ethnic, or racial) group through a deliberate policy of
killing its members.
Several years ago, Stan Hoig produced what many regard as the definitive account
of the Sand Creek Massacre, which has now been reprinted by the University of
Oklahoma Press. Hoig’s book, a moving epitaph to the Cheyenne Nation, has done
justice to the historical record through its well written narrative style, meticulously
documented throughout. Few readers could fail to be moved by some of the accounts in
this book, and the same readers might well also feel immense anger and frustration as
they witness actions that can only be described as inhumane and bloodthirsty—
actions, moreover, committed in the name of the very moral values upon which the
United States was founded.
At the time Hoig was writing, however, there was a problem with writing about
Sand Creek: the actual site of the village and the areas into which the massacre was
pursued by the Third Colorado were hidden from sight, lost to time and legend. Across
the century following 1864, efforts had been made to preserve the general vicinity, but
the precise location of the massacre could not be found; all efforts to locate it failed.
Finally, in 1998, the US Congress passed P.L. 105-243, the Sand Creek Massacre Site
Study Act, which called for the National Parks Service, the state of Colorado, and the
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Cheyenne and Arapaho Nations to work together to locate the site. The location had to
be pinpointed, it was felt, before the National Parks Service could assume guardianship in the future. The subsequent attempts to uncover the massacre site are related
by Jerome Greene and Douglas Scott in Finding Sand Creek: History, Archeology, and
the 1864 Massacre Site. This book is a detective story that adopts a multidisciplinary
approach, employing historical and archaeological research techniques as well as
tribal descriptions of the site. A number of pre-existing maps, created by earlier
researchers, have also been consulted. The book is not a history of the massacre, in the
manner of Hoig’s volume, but, rather, an account of how the researchers managed to
locate both the village and the surrounding field of operations undertaken by the Third
Colorado Volunteers. While it is not, strictly speaking, a historical account that sheds
any new light on the massacre itself, the project it describes is a significant one: not
only will the site henceforth be preserved, but the Cheyenne and Arapaho nations can
have a focus for memorialization and closure—and, perhaps, a measure of healing.
An episode in the Native American experience that seems never to have achieved
closure is the Battle of the Little Bighorn, an armed engagement that took place on
25–26 June 1876 between a combined force of Lakota Sioux and Northern Cheyenne
warriors and the US Seventh Cavalry near the Little Bighorn River in Montana
Territory. The battle represented a remarkable victory for the Lakota and Cheyenne,
as the Seventh Cavalry, under the command of General George Armstrong Custer, was
annihilated. Ever since, historians in the United States and elsewhere have been
reconsidering how it was that the troops of a modern army, just ten years after the
Civil War, could have been defeated by what was at the time considered to be an
inferior and primitive people. A number of advantages suggest, however, that the
Seventh Cavalry found itself in a very difficult position even before the fighting began.
For a start, though it is difficult to determine precisely how large the Native
American force was, it is usually held that they outnumbered the Seventh Cavalry by a
ratio of at least three to one (and, at some stages of the battle, even more). In addition,
some of the Indians were armed with rifles more advanced than those of the
cavalrymen, while the very ground over which the battle was fought gave the Lakota
and Northern Cheyenne an advantage. Custer’s troops, moreover, were not seasoned
soldiers skilled in combat conditions, and they were already in poor physical shape
because of the lack of sleep and the reduced rations occasioned by the campaign. The
battle, in short, was fought on terms set by those opposed to the Seventh Cavalry.
Of those serving in Custer’s unit, sixteen officers and 242 troopers were killed or
died of wounds, including Custer himself. After the battle, attempts were made to
identify the dead, but most had been stripped of their clothing, mutilated, and left
where they fell. When US forces entered the area later, they found it difficult to
identify many of the bodies, and all were simply buried collectively. Another fifty-two
cavalrymen who were wounded in the battle survived. It has not been accurately
determined how many Native Americans died in the battle; estimates range from
thirty-six (the oft-quoted Native American figure) up to as many as 300.
The Battle of the Little Bighorn quickly became part of western folklore in the
United States, the subject of plays, novels, and academic studies. All too frequently,
though, the voices of the Lakota Sioux and the Northern Cheyenne have been left out
of the literature, appearing only in a stereotyped or token manner. In the third volume
of Native American testimony about the Battle of the Little Bighorn, noted author
Richard G. Hardorff has produced Indian Views of the Custer Fight: A Source Book,
compiling thirty-eight interviews and statements from Native American eyewitnesses
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to the event. Here, twenty-nine Lakota Sioux and nine Northern Cheyenne detail
events in their own words—extracted from letters, newspaper accounts, US Army
reports, and manuscripts. Reproduced here as a series of statements, interviews, and
narratives, these accounts make remarkable reading. While some of the interviews, for
instance, are in a question-and-answer format, other accounts tell the story in a highly
descriptive fashion. We learn from these accounts that Custer was not dealing with the
typical ‘‘White Man’s Indian,’’ a ‘‘savage’’ given only to the basest of bloodthirsty
impulses; rather, we see men in combat recounting strategy, motivations, and the
respect they had for their foes. We even, on occasion, see the petty jealousies and gripes
that can appear in any body of armed men acting under orders from those with whom
they do not always agree. While Indian Views of the Custer Fight is not unique within
the genre of Native American studies, it is, nonetheless, a marvelous resource for those
seeking to understand something of the all-too-frequently forgotten ‘‘other side’’ of
what has gone down in history as ‘‘Custer’s Last Stand.’’ It is both informative and
inspirational, and a laudable addition to the literature of what happened on that
fateful day in June 1876.
It is to be hoped that Hardorff pursues his interest in retrieving this form of
testimony by following the subsequent destiny of the US Seventh Cavalry to the events
at Wounded Knee Creek, South Dakota, on 29 December 1890. At that time, the
Seventh Cavalry, still smoldering from its defeat at Little Bighorn fourteen years
earlier, took the opportunity to settle accounts with the Sioux encamped at Wounded
Knee. The subsequent massacre—which popular wisdom has preferred to label a
battle, though it was so one-sided that this term is hardly appropriate—was the final
confrontation in the three-century relationship between Native Americans and
expansionist whites on what the latter referred to as ‘‘the frontier.’’ The Sioux were
cut down mercilessly. Four Hotchkiss guns surrounding the camp opened fire, scything
through their victims like chaff. Less than an hour later, the fighting and killing had
ended. Almost two-thirds of the Sioux were casualties—at least 200 dead and wounded
were counted, though many others were not accounted for. The US Army lost twentyfive killed and thirty-nine wounded. The ‘‘battle’’ of Wounded Knee was a massacre of
men, women, and children, the last major action of its kind in the course of the
westward expansion of the United States.
Because genocide is a crime, academic literature about genocidal destruction is
frequently accompanied by partisan acceptance or rejection on the part of victim or
perpetrator populations. Sometimes serious academic scholarship is met by immediate
and unequivocal denial from those on the receiving end of allegations that genocide
was committed. Claims may be made about misquotation and the falsification of
research findings, or evidence may be dismissed as inaccurate.
Such was the somewhat heated response to the appearance in 2005 of Gary
Clayton Anderson’s study The Conquest of Texas: Ethnic Cleansing in the Promised
Land, 1820–1875. Anderson has written a highly detailed account of early Texas
history; when it first appeared, however, many commentators, particularly within
Texas itself, categorized it as little more than a new, ‘‘politically correct’’ view of Texas
history biased against the white settlers who made the republic, then the state, what it
is today. Others, in similar vein, took the book to be an attempt on Anderson’s part to
create a controversial and commercial reputation by interpreting well-known sources
of Texas history in a biased way. Rather than a groundbreaking study of multicultural
relations in early Texas, it was claimed, Anderson had instead produced a work
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proceeding from a flawed premise—namely, that the Native American perspective on
early Texas history has never truly been appreciated or studied.
Anderson’s primary thesis is that Anglo-Europeans and Spanish-speaking Texans
(Tejanos) engaged in an organized conspiracy to drive the Native Americans from
Texas, or to exterminate them. His book identifies an extensive and well-organized
campaign carried out by the invaders, in which little quarter was given. This is a
clearly revisionist work that contradicts much of the pre-existing literature on the
development of Texas during the nineteenth century.
In seeking to establish his case and to demythologize the romance of Texas history,
Anderson sometimes falls into traps he might better have avoided. There are
occasions, for example, when he oversimplifies the complex events and political
environment of Texas over his lengthy period of study—half a century during which
monumental changes took place in a wide variety of areas.
Take, for example, Anderson’s assessment of those allegedly responsible for much
of the destruction, the Texas Rangers. He characterizes them as an out-of-control and
bloodthirsty militia with few redeeming qualities, and in this they differed little from
many of the irregular militias established for the purpose of securing US rule over
territories claimed for white settlement—the Third Colorado Volunteers at Sand Creek
are another example among many. Little is new about this assessment: the early Texas
Rangers did indeed commit acts of barbarity on the frontier. Anderson’s description of
the Rangers as unrelenting and merciless killers, however, needs to be considered
within the context of the evidence upon which he bases his claims. This consists largely
of negative contemporary accounts produced by regular US Army officers who
disapproved of the Rangers’ military informality and apparent lack of discipline.
According to such reports, the Texas Rangers lacked what would today be called ‘‘the
warrior’s honor,’’ and for this they were often denigrated. Anderson, it would seem, has
taken many of these accounts at face value, and in so doing has built his profile from a
largely one-dimensional resource base. It would be interesting to learn whether a
broader range of sources might yield a different picture of the Rangers.
Further, given his topic, Anderson is on sensitive ground when he introduces
controversial terms such as ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ and ‘‘concentration camps’’—controversial owing to a lack of any sort of in-depth theoretical discussion of these twentieth
century concepts in their relationship to nineteenth century events. Further, he
concludes that although the Native Americans of Texas experienced ethnic cleansing,
they did not experience genocide—which he defines, contrary to international law as
defined in the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, as ‘‘the intentional killing of nearly all of a racial, religious, or cultural
group’’ (7).
Anderson’s book is based on extensive research and a thorough recounting of
detail; it brings out many fine points that have not previously seen the light of day,
emanating from hard work in archives throughout the United States. Anderson’s bias
is too readily apparent to make this reviewer comfortable, however; it would have been
preferable if he had allowed the total corpus of available evidence to speak for itself,
rather than laboring the point as he sometimes does. Does The Conquest of Texas
support its central thesis of a cohesive anti-Native conspiracy in early Texas?
Superficially, it does, though a very close reading of the sources and context upon
which the author bases his conclusions renders him vulnerable in a number of
important areas.
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Colonialism is a form of control frequently characterized by the establishment of
settler communities that result in the displacement, absorption, or destruction of preexisting indigenous communities. In the history of the United States, large numbers of
settlers left their original homes to start new outgrowth communities or to reinforce
those of their kin already there. In so doing, they took over—sometimes quite
brutally—land already occupied by Native Americans. Genocidal massacres of the
latter were not infrequent, and ongoing oppression or neglect has in numerous cases
persisted to the present day. Colonialism, in its impact on Native American
populations, also led to the suppression of local languages, religions, and folkways
as the settlers looked for ways to consolidate their rule and ward off what they
perceived as threats to the expansion of ‘‘their’’ territory in the new land. The human
cost was devastating and long lasting for the Native American populations taken over
by the colonizers, and the injury done to their sense of identity and self-worth has, in
many cases, yet to be healed.
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‘‘What happens when a nation tries to deal with its own genocidal past, using its own
criminal code, in its own state courts?’’ (2). This is one of the questions that Rebecca
Wittmann, professor of history at the University of Toronto, poses at the outset of her
book Beyond Justice: The Auschwitz Trial. The book deals with the trial of twenty
individuals alleged to have been involved in the atrocities that took place in the
Auschwitz death camp during World War II.
The trial began in December 1963; it took place in Frankfurt-am–Main, before a
German court and under German law. It lasted for more than 180 court days.
The 900-page judgment was rendered in August 1965, and all but three defendants
were convicted of either murder or aiding and abetting murder (3).
The book is divided into six chapters and includes a number of useful appendices,
such as a list of participants and a pre-trial chronology. Chapter 1 deals with the pretrial history of the case and lays out the general background against which the
Auschwitz trial took place. The author describes the state of the German judicial
system after the war and the influence of Allied forces on the prosecution of
Nazi perpetrators and explains the German Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal
Procedure, which were applied by the court. Chapter 2 sets out the course of the pretrial investigation and portrays the ambitious goal of the German prosecutors to turn
the trial into more than an ordinary criminal proceeding, one that would enable the
German public to face its past and serve as a lesson for the future. In this chapter
Wittmann also describes the prosecution’s trial strategy and provides an introduction
to the evidence that was to be offered by the survivors of Auschwitz during the trial.
Chapter 3 is an overview of the structure of the indictment; chapter 4 describes the
trial proceedings, summarizing the evidence given by survivors, experts, and former
SS officers, and provides an outline of German press coverage of the trial. Chapter 5
discusses the final arguments of the parties and the judgment. Chapter 6 looks at
responses to the judgment from the press (both West and East German, as well as
foreign), the German public, and some of the main actors in the trial. It also includes
the author’s concluding remarks.
In the introduction, Wittmann announces her main point of criticism of the trial,
which becomes the main theme of the book. The well-presented argument is that the
outcome of the Auschwitz trial was a paradox: on the one hand, the trial did succeed in
informing the largely ignorant German public of the horrors that had taken place in
Auschwitz, but, on the other hand, it provided a skewed understanding of those
horrors, because the trial became ‘‘a trial of sadists and reprobates,’’ rather than of the
camp system itself, and because the majority of the accused were convicted as aiders
and abettors instead of murderers and thus received sentences that did not justly
correspond to their crimes (38–39, 101, 271–74). According to Wittmann, this outcome
was primarily due to the application of the German penal code, with its narrow
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definition of murder; the unwillingness of the trial judges, and the German judiciary in
general, to interpret that definition of murder more broadly in Nazi trials; and
the imposition of light sentences for Nazi defendants in German courts at the time
(16, 44–48, 210–11, 273). In her words, ‘‘the West German penal code was not equipped
to ‘teach lessons’ about how to prevent or punish genocide’’ (94); ‘‘the main impediment
to effective justice in Nazi trials was the law, and its contemporary interpretation
in Nazi trials’’ (190).
Throughout the book, Wittmann builds her case against the German Criminal
Code and the German judiciary establishment of the 1960s. Her point is that the
requirement of the German penal code that a murder be committed with a specific
motive made ‘‘the presence of excessive brutality a necessity for the murder charge,’’
shifting the focus of the trial onto the most brutal perpetrators (101–2). The relevant
provision of the German Criminal Code, which is still valid today, provides that
A murderer is whoever kills a human being out of murderous lust, to satisfy his sexual
desires, from greed or otherwise base motives, treacherously or cruelly or with means
dangerous to the public or in order to make another crime possible or cover it up.1

According to Wittmann, this meant that in order for the prosecution to secure a
conviction of murder, it was not sufficient to show that a defendant had followed an
order from the top Nazi leaders to kill innocent people; it was also necessary to prove
personal initiative to commit crimes and to offer clear evidence that a defendant was
not merely following orders when he committed a crime. The author suggests that
this approach even lent a certain legitimacy to the orders issued by the Nazi regime.
As a further result of this narrow definition of murder, the author argues, the majority
of the Auschwitz guards, who ‘‘did not demonstrate excessively violent behavior’’ but
were ‘‘hesitant killers who completed their tasks anyway’’ were convicted as aiders and
abettors (101). This meant that ‘‘many volunteer SS officers who had killed hundreds
of people were beginning to look innocent and a few vicious sadists were becoming the
sole legal focus’’ (142). The author’s view is that not only did this approach place
the genocide committed in the gas chambers of Auschwitz in the background, it also
fragmented the Holocaust into a series of smaller, unrelated incidents, such that the
overall picture of a state-organized genocide was overlooked.
It is interesting that Wittmann points to important distinctions and complexities
in law in relation to participation in and commission of crimes. Even today, courts
dealing with similar crimes are often faced with doctrinal and evidentiary challenges
in relation to varying forms and degrees of participation in crimes on the part of the
defendants before them. However, considering the criticism of the definition of murder
in Germanic criminal law, it should be noted that although Wittmann mentions the
criminal act of manslaughter, she does not explain why the defendants were not
charged with this offense, or with a similar and lesser form of murder. Thus, it is
surprising to read, at the end of the book, the comment that ‘‘the trials that did proceed
on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity were flawed too’’ (274). Wittmann
does not clarify the opinion expressed in this remark, which leaves the reader
wondering what solution she might have in mind for the problem of the Auschwitz
trial, namely that it focused on the most brutal perpetrators and overlooked the
systematic nature of the killings.
In this context, it should also be noted that the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has further developed the legal doctrine of joint criminal
enterprise, a form of criminal liability already applied by and derived from the
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International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg and other trials conducted by the
Allied Powers after World War II. This doctrine provides that an accused can be
convicted as a principal perpetrator if he or she shared a common intent to mistreat
prisoners and contributed to the furtherance of such a goal. Charges under joint
criminal enterprise are very suitable for concentration-camp cases, and it is this
form of criminal liability that has been applied in ICTY cases concerning detention
camps. Such an approach would certainly have been appropriate for the purposes of
the prosecutors in the Auschwitz trial, and it would have remedied many of the
concerns raised by the author. It is not clear whether the Frankfurt court had
this legal tool at its disposal at the time, although it was used by the British and
American Military Commissions, which operated under different bodies of law, twenty
years before.
Wittmann raises another interesting question: To what extent should courts be
involved in writing history? Through her disapproval of the Auschwitz trial court’s
decision not to go beyond determining the culpability of each accused and not to make
findings on the historical events that allowed the creation of Auschwitz, she seems to
suggest that the courts should have a bigger role in the writing of history. The court in
the Auschwitz trial, according to Wittmann, did miss an opportunity to deal more
comprehensively with the overall events in Auschwitz. The court should have been
able to do more in this regard without disturbing its constitutional and principal task
of examining the guilt or innocence of the defendants appearing before it. But it is
Wittmann who has missed an opportunity to elaborate why criminal courts should be
writing history. From a legal point of view, criminal courts are best equipped to judge
individual criminal responsibility in accordance with the law, and not to write history.
It is certainly not this reviewer’s opinion that courts have no role whatsoever in this
arena; the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals and the contemporary international
criminal courts are all good examples of courts making considerable contributions to
history, and Wittmann’s criticism of the Frankfurt court is a valuable contribution to
this debate.
Wittmann is not only critical of the Auschwitz trial. She has extensively explored
the press coverage of the trial and some debates following the trial (174–90 and
chap. 6), and she concludes that the trial ‘‘illuminated the crimes of Auschwitz for a
public that was almost completely and often deliberately ignorant of them’’ (271). The
trial did indeed confront the German people with the details, as well as the magnitude,
of the crimes committed in their name at Auschwitz.
Wittmann’s book should be of interest to legal scholars, historians, philosophers,
and others interested in studying cases involving the gravest crimes. The book is
more than just a reminder of a very black page in history and an important
trial: Wittmann raises significant contemporary questions about how nations should
deal with their own genocidal past. This is of particular significance because,
for example, courts in the former Yugoslavia are now increasingly trying war crimes
and genocide cases under their national criminal codes. It is also worth noting that the
new International Criminal Court relies on the ability and willingness of states
parties to prosecute war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity committed in
their own territory (the complementarity principle). One crucial distinction
between these examples and the Auschwitz trial, however, is the involvement
of international lawyers in these trials and the recent development of international
criminal law.
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Note
1.

Strafgesetzbuch [German Criminal Code], art. 211(2). An English translation is provided
by the German Federal Ministry of Justice at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/St
GB.htm. Wittmann offers another, very similar, translation of the same text on page 44.
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Lisa Schirch. Ritual and Symbol in Peacebuilding. Bloomfield,
CT: Kumarian Press, 2005. Pp. 224, paper. $25.95 US.
Reviewed by Janine Minkler, Department of Sociology and Social Work, Northern Arizona
University, Flagstaff

A dancer stands before the Nazi gas chambers; in a moment of poised defiance, she
glides up to the guard, seizes his gun, and shoots him. Lisa Schirch opens Ritual and
Symbol in Peacebuilding with this story, dramatically illustrating one of her key
points: through the act of ‘‘doing,’’ the doing becomes reality. ‘‘The dancer acts as if she
is alive and powerful,’’ Schirch writes, ‘‘and through dancing, she becomes alive and
powerful’’ (3). Traditional peacebuilding1 approaches tend to deal with issues directly,
linearly, and rationally and, ironically, to reproduce adversarial space by placing
conflicting parties in opposition to each other across the negotiating table. Schirch
proposes that those working to resolve conflict should instead consider facilitating
‘‘peacebuilding dramas’’—ritual and symbolic acts that engage the senses, passions,
and emotions to create a ‘‘unique social space’’ that includes cooperative images and
activities.
Schirch, associate professor of peacebuilding at Eastern Mennonite University,
draws on her work with three different communities to examine how rituals work to
erode rigid social structures. In her work with First Nations peoples in the province of
Ontario, Schirch has observed how the power of silence operates in ways that cannot
be conveyed through verbal communication, the primary medium of conventional
conflict resolution. The activities involved in smudging ceremonies (purification
ceremonies during which varieties of sage are burned to drive our harmful influences)
work to create a sacred space distinguished from everyday conflict and struggles.
Schirch also describes how women’s spirituality groups use ritual to resist oppressive
patriarchal structures and create new possibilities and opportunities for positive social
change. Through both improvised and formalized rituals, women’s spirituality groups
seek to create new perceptions and experiences.
Finally, Schirch documents her observations of peacebuilding activities among
Turkish and Greek Cypriots, who have been in conflict since 1974. A group of Greek
and Turkish Cypriots was brought together for the first time in the 1990s for training
in conflict resolution. At an informal dinner, they had an opportunity to view each
other as more than their ethnic identities—as parents, teachers, victims of war, men,
women, and so forth. ‘‘Eating and dancing take on new meanings when they are done
in the company of enemies,’’ Schirch explains (5). Such informal ritual space is critical
to creating opportunities for peacebuilding. ‘‘In ritual,’’ writes Schirch, ‘‘the impossible
and unlikely can come true as people create a unique context where, if only
temporarily, symbols, sensory cues, and the expression of emotion communicate what
words alone cannot’’ (86).
Schirch has not limited her examination of the use of symbols and rituals in
peacebuilding to one body of knowledge. She draws on the work of sociologists such as
Émile Durkheim to examine how symbols function to externalize collective sentiments
while concurrently drawing on contemporary biology to examine how rituals and
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symbols alter consciousness and reorganize cognitive systems. She offers a comprehensive justification for the use of ritual in peacebuilding, carefully analyzing how
rituals transform space, worldviews, identities, and relationships.
Schirch’s extensive justification of the use of ritual and symbol is an important
contribution to the literature in mediation and peacebuilding. Many key texts2 focus on
the continued use of language to address conflict but overlook the more subtle and
‘‘messy dimension of conflict’’ (38) that symbols and rituals access. As Schirch explains,
‘‘Symbolic acts can penetrate the impenetrable, overwhelm the defensive, and convey
complex messages without saying a single word’’ (4). Rituals help people make sense of
the world, especially during periods of transition, when the symbols of the old social
structures no longer adequately express collective sentiments. By engaging the
emotions and senses, rituals ultimately have the power to transform the way we
experience the world. Furthermore, Schirch maintains that ‘‘ritual does not solve
problems by negotiating the best solution, but by creating a new frame for interpreting
the problem’’ (104). This makes the use of ritual a much-needed addition to traditional
negotiation models.
This extensive justification seems designed to prepare the reader for the final
chapter on how to design peacebuilding rituals. Yet one continually wonders just how
rituals can be constructed in ways that underscore nonviolent cooperative action
among groups in conflict. Aside from anecdotal examples from her case studies,
Schirch never adequately addresses this. The final chapter is designed to ‘‘synthesize
these key ideas into practical applications for peacebuilders’’ (156), yet it contains very
few practical tools. When a few guiding tips are offered, they are oversimplified,
making their direct application unclear. While Schirch offers lists—‘‘places for
peacebuilding,’’ ‘‘sensual stimuli in peacebuilding,’’ ‘‘common peacebuilding symbols,’’
‘‘peacebuilding actions,’’ ‘‘informal rituals for peacebuilding’’—she gives no real
direction; that is, there are no real tips on how to actually apply ritual and symbol
when working to resolve conflict. To her credit, Schirch acknowledges the importance
of helping communities discover and develop their own rituals rather than imposing
some preconceived idea on them; however, we are still left wondering just how ritual
and symbol can be thoughtfully introduced to parties in conflict. Finally, the violent
imagery of the dancer shooting the Nazi continues to haunt the pages, although it is
never mentioned again. Schirch leaves us hanging, wondering how the use of such
violent imagery and its important position at the beginning of the book connect with
her key insight—that ritual is critical to the peacebuilding process. Despite these
discrepancies, anyone who wants to understand the importance of introducing ritual
and symbol into the peacebuilding process will gain a clear and supported rationale
from this text.
Schirch’s work is critical in helping to establish a basis and justification for the use
of ritual in peacebuilding. While some have begun to examine the importance of
addressing the emotional and symbolic roots of conflict,3 few have focused on ritual as
a key peacebuilding tool.4 Thus, Schirch’s work is critical at a time when peacebuilding
efforts around the world seem themselves to be in crisis.

Notes
1.

Peacebuilding (as distinct from peacemaking, peacekeeping, and conflict resolution) tends
to focus on the continued economic, political, and social instabilities that groups in conflict
face even after the conflict has ended.
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Samuel Totten, William S. Parsons, and Israel Charny, eds.
Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts, 2nd ed.
New York: Routledge, 2004. Pp. 532, paper. $26.95 US.
Reviewed by Samuel M. Edelman, Dean, the College of Arts and Sciences,
American Jewish University (formerly the University of Judaism)

Century of Genocide begins with the words ‘‘Will the killing ever stop?’’. This is a
profound question, as is the answer. In seventeen chapters and an introduction, the
answer is clearly No. For any one interested in providing their students with a
comprehensive understanding of genocide in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries,
this book is an excellent resource.
In this single text, the reader can move from the genocide against the Hereros in
Southwest Africa to discussions of the Armenians; the Ukrainians and genocide in the
former Soviet Union; the targeting of Jews, Gypsies, and disabled people during the
Shoah; the Tutsis in Rwanda and Hutus in Burundi; the Cambodians; massacres and
genocide in Indonesia and East Timor; genocide against Kurds in Iraq and Sudanese
Muslims in Darfur; and genocides perpetrated against various indigenous peoples.
The foreword by Israel Charny makes a sensitive and passionate statement about
genocide and its implications for many groups beyond the survivors of various
genocides. Charny speaks about learning to care about human life. This concept of
developing genuine and mutual respect and caring as foundations for human behavior
is in direct opposition to those who preach tolerance but do not practice it. Clearly
Charny’s work in the foreword to this text sets the tone of the book and gives us a sense
of its direction.
The introduction by Samuel Totten and William Parsons integrates the ideas and
concepts developed in the foreword and goes on to set out the parameters for the
discussion in the rest of the text. Most important, though, is the authors’ outline for a
campaign against genocide. Totten and Parsons set out a program for the scholarly
study of genocide while also addressing the need for the financing and implementing
a global genocide prevention and intervention effort (including an effective genocide
early warning system) and the creation of more robust structures for educating about
genocide.
Chapters 1 to 14, each focusing on a specific genocide (e.g., the Ottoman Turk
genocide of the Armenians; the Khmer Rouge–perpetrated Cambodian genocide; the
extremist Hutu genocide of the Tutsis and moderate Hutus in Rwanda), are written by
well-known scholars. The critical essays that begin each chapter provide the context
for the genocide, while the second part of each chapter comprises a compendium of
eyewitness accounts relating to the specific genocide under discussion. Each chapter is
similarly structured, so that there is a strong sense of internal consistency throughout
the book. This new edition also includes maps of each of the genocides discussed.
Chapter 15—Martin Mennecke’s ‘‘Genocide in Kosovo?’’—is also new to the second
edition. This is an important chapter because it confronts the issue of whether or not
the events that took place in Kosovo represent a true genocide. Mennecke’s discussion
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is comprehensive and well developed in its presentation of the issues surrounding
Kosovo.
Chapters 16 and 17, though, offer students of genocide critically important
insights; these two chapters make this edition a must for anyone teaching or learning
about genocide. Jerry Fowler’s ‘‘Out of the Darkness’’ documents his years of work for
the US Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Committee on Conscience, discovering and
calling world attention to newly developing genocides. This chapter gets us into the
Darfur situation, as well as other potential genocides, and shows the importance of
genocide early warning systems in the modern world. Chapter 17 by Samuel Totten, on
intervention and prevention, is a significant corollary to Fowler’s work. Totten gives
us, in a clearly written and well-argued text, the problems and possibilities of genocide
intervention and prevention. He shows us the structural problems, as well as the
problem of lack of political will to deal with genocide intervention and prevention;
but he also shows us ways in which we can have an impact. From individuals to
groups to nations, people can have an impact on genocide and, indeed, can change the
world—but it is, and will be, a struggle.
In the end, that is what this book is about: the struggle to bring about significant
and profound global change in fighting to end the scourge of genocide in our time.
That is not an easy thing to do, and this is not an easy book to read. Nevertheless,
it is a must read.
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